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Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese:
Why Federal Judges Cannot Always
Be Trusted to Police Themselves
and What Congress Can Do About It
Lara A. Bazelon'
I. OVERVIEW
O NE federal judge called a female employee into his chambers and
allegedly sexually assaulted her.' Another judge, while sitting on a
panel overseeing the work of the Independent Counsel, leaked classified
information to the media and delayed disclosing that he was the source
of the leak until threatened with an investigation.3 Still another awarded
substantial fees to a former law partner and campaign treasurer in more
than a dozen cases without disclosing his relationship to them.4 Yet another
reassigned a bankruptcy case to himself to help a criminal defendant under
his supervision and froze the eviction proceedings against her, allowing the
defendant to live rent-free, for three years, in a house to which she had no
legal claim.5 When asked to explain these actions, this jurist gave testimony
that was inaccurate and misleading in material and significant respects.
6
Most recently, a judge's name and cell phone number were discovered on
a client list seized by police investigating a prostitution ring.7 All of these
I Professor Bazelon graduated cuam laude from New York University Law School in 2000
and received her undergraduate degree cum laude from Columbia University in 1996. She
worked for more than six years as a trial attorney in the Office of the Federal Public Defender
in Los Angeles, CA, before joining the law firm of Caldwell Leslie & Proctor. She has been
an Adjunct Professor at Loyola University Law School since 2oo6.
2 See Lise Olsen, Lawmakers Shocked By Kent Allegations, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2007, at
Ai.
3 See ThE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF I980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 239
F.R.D. 116, 178 (2oo6) [hereinafter BREYER COMMITrEE REPORT].
4 See Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs. Justice: For This Judge and His
Friends, One Good Turn Led To Another, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2oo6, at AI.
5 See SPECIAL COMM.,REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT FROM
THE COMM. CONVENED PURSUAND TO 28 U.S.C. §353(A) TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS
OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT IN THE COMPLAINTS DOCKETED UNDER 05-89097 AND 04-89039
PERTAINING TO COMPLAINT 05-89097, 5-9 (zoo6). www.ceg.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/re-
port.pdf [hereinafter REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT].
6 See id. at 20.
7 See Robert Boczkiewicz, Ex-FBIAgentAidingProbe of FederalJudge, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN,
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judges continue to sit on the bench, enjoying the power and prestige of the
office,8 and only one of them is subject to any restrictions on the kinds of
cases he may hear.9
In an institution as large as the federal judiciary, which counts more
than 1200 judges among its members, 10 it is not surprising that there are a
few bad apples. Nor is it surprising that, if left unchecked, those few could
exact a cost disproportionate to their number by damaging the integrity of
the branch as a whole. If, on the other hand, judges who cross the line are
thoroughly investigated and appropriately sanctioned, public confidence
in the federal judiciary will remain strong. Unfortunately, thorough
investigations and appropriate sanctions are not always forthcoming
because federal judges, whose job it is to police their colleagues, often fail
to do so. This problem is a serious one. Unelected and virtually impossible
Mar. 13, 2oo8, available at zoo8 WLNR 4975193; Felisa Cardona, FBI Talks To Judge's Ex-
Wife, DENv. PosT, Aug. 12, 2007, at CI.
8 See Dan Christensen, Judges, Lawyers Fire Back at GOP Critic in Congress, BROWARD
DAILY Bus. REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at I (reporting that a complaint filed by two congressmen
asking the Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit to investigate the leak made by Judge Cudahy
was disregarded); Pamela A. Maclean, Judging Federal Judges, NAT'L L.J., Feb. I8, 2oo8, at I8
(reporting that Judge Kent returned to work on January 3, 2oo8, following a four-month
paid suspension); Lise Olsen, More Judges Under Inquiry, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2oo8, at
B I (reporting that Judge Nottingham remains on the bench while under investigation for
judicial misconduct after admitting that he "used a high-priced escort service"); Carri Geer
Thevenot, Complaint Against Judge Dismissed, LAS VEGAs REV. J., Oct. 4, 2007, at B 1 (reporting
that the judicial council for the Ninth Circuit dismissed misconduct complaint against Judge
James Mahan).
9 Kent was indicted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for one count of aggravated sexual
abuse, three counts of abusive sexual contact, one count of attempted aggravated sexual
abuse, and one count of obstructing justice. See United States v. Samuel B. Kent, CR No.
o8-596-RV (Superseding Indictment filed Jan. 6, 2oo9). See Lise Olsen, Mary Flood, & Roma
Khanna, Judge Indicted On Sex Abuse Charges, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 29, zoo8, at AI. After the
Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation, Judge Kent "agreed he (would) not
handle any civil or criminal case in which the United States (was) a party or in which sexual
misconduct of any kind (was) alleged." See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against
U. S. Dist. Judge Samuel B. Kent, Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198o, No.
07 -05-35 i-oo86 (5th Cit. Jud. Council Dec. 20,2007) at 3, availableat http//www.ca5.uscourts.
gov/news/SK.Order.pdf. [hereinafter Second Kent Order]; see also Cindy George, Kent's Docket
Contains Only Civil Cases, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 16, zoo8, at B5. Judge Kent has now retired from
the bench and, on February 23, 2oo9, agreed to plead guilty to obstruction of justice. While
the charge can carry a maximum penalty of 2o years, the government is expected to only seek
a three-year sentence for Judge Kent. Kate Murphy, Federal Judge Accepts Deal, Endinga Sexual
Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2oo9, at A14.
io See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: RethinkingtheJustificationfor Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 97 CAL. L. REv. 95, 116 (2009) (citing Adm. Off. of the U.S. Courts, 2007,
Judicial Business of the United States Courts: Annual Report of the Director 42).
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to remove, federal judges must maintain their integrity to have legitimacy;
that is, they must embody justice by applying the law equally to everyone.
When they fall short in the judicial disciplinary context, the error is not
confined to allowing sanctionable misconduct to go unpunished. Judges'
reluctance to police their own fosters a perception of institutional bias that
gives ammunition to those seeking to impose ever greater restrictions on
judicial independence.
In 1980, Congress passed the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980 (The Act), which vested judges with the exclusive authority to
discipline poor behavior within their ranks, which, while problematic, did
not rise to the level of an impeachable offense." The Act requires that a
special council of judges investigate credible complaints that accuse their
brethren of having "engaged in conduct prejudicial to the expeditious
administration of the business of the courts.""2 Upon finding that a judge
has committed misconduct, the council can temporarily bar the offending
judge from hearing cases, issue a public rebuke, recommend that the judge
take early retirement, or forward the facts of the investigation to a national
committee of judges with an impeachment recommendation.13
A commission created in 2004 to study the Act's enforcement concluded
recently that, while judges do an excellent job of handling run-of-the-mill
misconduct complaints, they botch high-visibility matters nearly thirty
percent of the time, an error rate deemed "far too high."' 14 In these cases,
judges often fail to follow internal procedures, 5 sweeping the embarrassing
i i See Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198o, Pub. L.
No. 96-458,94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
12 See z8 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), 352(a), 353(a)(I)-(3), (c) (Supp. 2005).
13 See id. § 354(a)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(I)-(2).
14 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 122-23.
15 Often, but not always. A notable exception is the Fifth Circuit judicial council's han-
dling of the misconduct complaint against Judge G. Thomas Porteous. The complaint alleged
that Porteous lied repeatedly under oath, filed a bankruptcy petition under a false name,
hid assets and gambling debts, accepted gifts from litigants, and engaged in fraud. See In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against U. S. Dist. Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. Under
the Judicial Conduct & Disability Act of I98O, No. 07-05-351-oo85 (5th Cir. Jud. Council
Dec. 20, 2007) at 3-4, available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov.news/news/PorteousOrder/ME
MORANDUM%zoORDER%zoAND%2oCERTIFICATION.PDE After the judicial coun-
cil concluded that "substantial evidence" supported the allegations, it forwarded the matter
to the National Judicial Conference to investigate whether the misconduct was grounds for
impeachment. See id. at 3-5. Since this order was issued, the National Judicial Conference
recommended to the House of Representatives that Porteous be impeached. On September
10, 2008, the judicial council issued a final order in the case barring Porteous from receiving
new cases for a two-year period "or until Congress takes final action on the impeachment
proceedings, whichever occurs earlier."
Order and Public Reprimand In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against U.S. Dist.
Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, No. 07-
05-35I-OO85 (511 Cir. Jud. Council Sept. 10, 2008) at 4, available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.
gov/news/GTP%zoORDER%2oAND%zoPUBLIC%2oREPRIMAND. In issuing this pub-
2oo8-2oo9]
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allegations under the rug, issuing cryptic dismissal orders, or responding
with sanctions that are inadequately severe and ill-justified. 16 While the
high-visibility matters are a tiny fraction of the total, they are the public
face of the judicial disciplinary system because of the attention they receive
and the outrage they generate.' 7 These mishandled cases not only give the
judiciary a black eye, they "may discourage those with legitimate complaints
from using the Act," based on a belief that the system is unjust.'8
This Article argues that the "far too high" error rate exists because
judges have a tendency to let their accused colleagues off the hook out of
favoritism, undue sympathy, and a desire to protect the reputation of their
circuit. This problem, known as institutional bias,' 9 persists due to four
interrelated factors, all of which find support, to varying degrees, in the
language of the Act or its legislative history. These factors-the secrecy
that shrouds the disciplinary process; the lopsided allocation of rights
between the complainant and the accused; the perception of the Act as
serving a rehabilitative rather than a disciplinary purpose; and resistance
to transferring high-profile cases out of circuit, where the judges are less
likely to know, and sympathize with, the accused-have created a level of
dysfunction in the Act's enforcement. And, because these problems are
rooted in the language of the Act and its legislative history, it is not just
judicial attitudes but the Act itself that must be reformed.
To remedy the corrosive effect of institutional bias, Congress must
rewrite the Act in several significant respects, and the judiciary must be
more vigilant in enforcing it. The secretive disciplinary proceedings should
be open and accountable to the public, and the complainant as well as the
judge should be given equal procedural rights. Rather than privileging
self-correction, the Act should promote uniformity in the meting out of
discipline to ensure that the punishment fits the misconduct. Finally,
out-of-circuit transfers should be encouraged to reduce the risk that those
sitting in judgment are good friends and trusted colleagues of the accused.
Failure to amend the Act in these critical respects has two serious
and interlinking consequences: a perception that the federal judiciary is
incapable of policing its members; and, responsive to that, the potential
enactment of legislation by Congress transferring disciplinary authority
lic reprimand and sanction, the council stated that it was "taking the maximum disciplinary
steps allowed by law." Id. at 5.
16 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 173.
17 See id. at 123 (stating that "[b]ecause the matters at issue have received publicity, the
public is particularly likely to form a view of the judiciary's handling of all cases upon the basis
of these few").
18 Id.; see also Patricia A. MacLean, War Stories Over Blasts From the Bench, NAT'L L. J. Feb.
25, 2oo8 at 19 (reporting that lawyers rarely file misconduct complaints against federal judges
because they believe that they will face indifference or retaliation).
19 The problem is also known as "guild favoritism" and "institutional favoritism."
BREYER COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 119.
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over judges to the executive or legislative branch. Neither is hypothetical.
Public dissatisfaction with judicial self-policing has grown in recent years, 0
and Congress has responded with proposals to install an Inspector General
to watch over the judiciary,"l a solution that' many feel would threaten
judicial independence and implicate the separation of powers doctrine."2
This Article's critique of the judicial system of self-discipline is located
within a broader discussion about the shifting power dynamic between
Congress and the judiciary. Legal scholars who study the fraught and
complex relationship between the two branches tend to focus on the
ways in which congressional initiatives designed to gain greater control
over federal judges affect the twin values of judicial independence and
judicial accountability1 3 Defining, valuing, and striking the appropriate
balance between independence and accountability has generated a wealth
of scholarship centered on the constitutional implications of empowering
one branch at the expense of the other.2 4 The goal of this Article is not to
20 See In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference Committee To Review Circuit Council
Conduct & Disability Orders, 449 E3d io6, 117 (U.S. Jud. Conference Comm. 2oo6) (Winter,
J., dissenting) ("A self-regulatory procedure suffers from the weaknesses that many observers
will be suspicious that complainants against judges will be disfavored. The Committee's
decision in this case can only fuel such suspicion."); BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3,
at I 19 (stating that the Committee's mandate, in response to "recent criticism from Congress,"
was to assess whether the Act's enforcement was hampered by "institutional favoritism");
MacLean, supra note 8, at I (criticizing the Act, based on a study of recent disciplinary cases,
as standardless, overly secretive, and likely to encourage "retaliation" against complainants).
2 1 This effort has been spearheaded by Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), who
for years has publicly expressed the view that Congress needed to exercise more oversight
over federal judges because they have failed to police themselves adequately. See Jesse J.
Holland, GOP Probe of Judiciary After Schiavo Not Happening, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Apr. 26,
2005, at 7 ("[Congress] will begin assessing whether the disciplinary authority delegated to
the judiciary has been responsibly exercised and ought to continue." (quoting Sensenbrenner
speaking to the judiciary in 2004)). Congressional efforts to pass Inspector General legislation
are discussed in infra Part III.B.
22 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at i19 ("[A] system that relies for
investigation upon persons or bodies other than judges risks undue influence with the
Constitution's insistence on judicial independence, threatening directly or indirectly
distortion of the unbiased handling of individual cases that Article III seeks to guarantee.")
For an excellent discussion of the constitutional concerns arising from aggressive congressional
oversight of the federal judiciary, seeTodd David Peterson, Congressional Investigations of Federal
Judges, 90 IowA L. REV. I, 54-66 (2004).
23 See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2oo6); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT
THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman,
eds., 2002).
24 See generally Judith Resnik, Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: PuzzlingAbout Why &How
to Value the Independence of Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 24-47; Susan Bandes, Judging,
Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 CASE W. L. REV. 947, 955-64 (2oo6);
Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations,
95 GEo. L.J. 909, 913-18 (2007); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
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retread this richly-mined ground, but rather to explore the issue of whether
Congress can save the intrabranch judicial disciplinary system by making
relatively modest amendments to its governing statute. By answering this
question in the affirmative, the Article need not-and does not-confront
the thorny questions of interbranch encroachment on Article III power.
True, the reforms it proposes require a flexing of congressional muscle,
but only-to paraphrase former President Clinton's assessment of a very
different kind of legislation-as a means of mending the Act, not ending
it. 2
Part II of this Article provides brief history of the federal judiciary's
disciplinary system, outlines the concerns animating the passage of the
Act, and concludes with a discussion of how the judiciary has interpreted
its salient provisions. Part III discusses the judiciary's mishandling of a
misconduct complaint filed against federal district court judge Manuel
Real, explains how the case came to symbolize the Act's deficiencies,
and describes Congress's response, which was to explore impeachment
proceedings against Real and propose legislation replacing the Act
with an Inspector General. Part IV analyzes the judiciary's reaction to
criticism that its disciplinary system was a failure: the establishment of a
committee to study the effectiveness of the Act, the committee's findings
and recommendations, and the judiciary's enactment of mandatory Rules
designed to bring rigor and uniformity to the disciplinary process. Part V
uses three recent cases to explain why, although necessary, the new Rules do
not cure the problem of institutional bias. Part VI argues that only Congress
can correct the problem by rewriting key parts of the statute to require
that judges afford complainants equal rights, transfer high-profile cases
out-of-circuit, conduct disciplinary proceedings in a public forum, impose
mandatory punishments for serious misconduct, and report any findings of
probable criminal conduct-impeachable or not-to the executive branch
for prosecution.
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966-76 (2002);
Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56
CASE W. L. REV. 911, 915-22 (2006); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, io6 COLUM. L.
REV. z 168 (2OO6).
25 See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Editorial, Value Judgments, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1996, at




II. THE LAWS GOVERNING JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
A. Filling the Void Between Impeachment and "Doing Nothing at All"
Federal judges are appointed for life under the U.S. Constitution,
subject to "good behavior," 6 and may not be removed from office except
by impeachment, 7 an unwieldy political process that is rarely invoked. 8 In
the entire history of the United States, only seven federal judges have been
successfully impeached by the House of Representatives, convicted by
the Senate, and removed from office: one for drunkenness and dementia,
and the other six for committing illegal acts ranging from treason to tax
evasion. 9
The Framers provided for the lifetime appointment of federal judges to
insulate them against the vagaries of public opinion and political pressure.30
Jurists that need not worry about serving a particular constituency to
safeguard their jobs, it was thought, would be better positioned to rule with
neutrality, independence, and detachment.3 This logic, while sound, is not
flawless. As numerous scholars have discussed, there is an inherent tension
between independence and accountability.32 Judges are human beings,
z6 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § i.
27 Judges are civil officers who may be impeached for "Treason, Bribery, or other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4. One noted scholar has defined
impeachable offenses as "conduct amounting to a gross breach of trust or serious abuse of
power," such as obvious corruption, misapplication of funds, encroachment or contempt of
legislative procedures, or the commission of other serious, illegal acts. Edward D. Re, Article
III Federal Judges, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 79, 85-86 (1999) (quoting Harvard Law
Professor Lawrence Tribe).
z8 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
Sept. 29, zoo5) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("In the late 197os, Congress became concerned
that Article III judges were, effectively, beyond discipline because the impeachment process
is so cumbersome that it's seldom used." (citing iz6 CONG. REC. 28,O91 (I980) (statement
of Rep. DeConcini))); see also United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Indeed, it is all too well known that the impeachment process is particularly cumbersome,
time consuming, and susceptible to political whim and emotional reaction.").
29 Judge Pickering was impeached for drunkenness and dementia; Judge Humphreys
for "incitement to revolt and rebellion against the nation;" Judges Archibald and Hastings for
soliciting or accepting bribes; Judges Ritter and Claiborne for tax evasion; and Judge Nixon
for lying to the grand jury. See Re, supra note 27, at 89.
30 See, e.g., Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 845 ("Article III of the Constitution affords members
of the federal judiciary substantial protections to assure their freedom from coercion or
influence by the executive and legislative branches."); see also Russell R. Wheeler & Robert
A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEo. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2007) (stating that
Article III "protections serve a basic constitutional goal: impartial decisionmaking").
31 See Re, supra note 27, at 8o-83.
32 For a discussion of this tension in the judicial disciplinary context, see Alex B. Long,
Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again: Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability,
and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, io6 W. VA. L. REV. I, 1-1 7 (2003).
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and wearing a black robe does not divest them of their foibles. While
most members of the judiciary exercise their authority with courtesy and
restraint,33 the power and privilege that comes with the office encourages
a small number of them to behave intemperately, unethically, and, on
occasion, outside the bounds of the law.
To be sure, federal judges-with the exception of the nine on the
Supreme Court-have their rulings subjected to scrutiny, and potentially
reversal. A litigant who can show that a lower-level judge misapplied the
law or overlooked important facts stands a chance of prevailing the second
time around. But not all judicial errors can be categorized as mistakes of
law or fact. There are also occasions when a litigant's concerns center on
a judge's behavior rather than the legal soundness of a particular ruling.
What relief is available, for example, to an individual who complains of
unfair treatment because the judge who presided over the case displayed
an obvious personal bias in favor of the other side? What should an attorney
do about a suspicion that a sitting judge is acting unethically by misusing
the powers of her office, communicating privately with one party in a case
without the knowledge of the other, or mingling professional obligations
with personal interests in a way that casts doubt on her integrity? Is there a
recourse for lawyers who are subjected to habitual and unwarranted verbal
abuse from a particular judge?
The traditional system of appellate review is not designed to deal with
these sticky issues. 3 Nor is the U.S. Constitution. From 1798, when the
Framers established the federal judiciary, until the late twentieth century,
there was no system in place to deal with judicial misbehavior falling short
of a "High Crime of Misdemeanor."3 The Act was passed to fill this void,
empowering the judges themselves to patrol the grey area separating
impeccable conduct from impeachable offenses.36 Congress purposely
created a self-policing system to enable judges to punish misconduct that
was previously beyond sanction while at the same time avoiding unwarranted
and-possibly unconstitutional-intrusions on judicial independence.
3 7
The Act has been subject to a variety of constitutional challenges
nonetheless. Facial challenges posit that impeachment is the only
33 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N 3415,4319 ("The
Uudiciary] Committee recognizes that the great majority of our existing federal judges
perform their duties in a dedicated and capable manner.").
34 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 435 n.z (1985) ("Uudicial councils]
exist to provide an administrative remedy for misconduct of a judge for which no judicial
remedy is available." (citing In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 595 Fzd 517 (CA 9, 1979))).
35 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
36 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3415,4318 (stating
that the Act was passed to "fill the void which currently exists in the law between impeachable
offenses and doing nothing at all").
37 See id. at 4320 ("The Committee believes that the Act succeeds in protecting the
fragile independence required for federal judges.").
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constitutionally permissible form of judicial policing, thus making an intra-
branch disciplinary system an unlawful encroachment on a power granted
exclusively to Congress.3 As-applied challenges encompass a broader array
of claims, some focusing on a perceived lack of due process, others on the
punishments themselves, arguing, for example, that temporarily forbidding
the assignment of new cases to a judge amounts to removal from office.3 9
Every federal court to consider these facial challenges has rejected them,
and with one slender exception, as-applied challenges have met the same
fate.4 While the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the question
of the Act's constitutionality, it has suggested in dicta that the judiciary is
authorized to take reasonable measures to "put [its] own house in order."41
Thus, while several prominent scholars have suggested recently that Act's
constitutionality is still "debatable,"4 it is a debate that remains liveliest in
academia, rather than the courtroom.
B. The Judicial Council and Disability Act of 1980
1. Provisions of the Act.-The Act mandates that every federal circuit
-there are thirteen-have its own judicial council, comprised of sitting
district and appellate court judges and chaired by the chief judge of the
circuit.43 Along with a myriad of administrative functions, the members
38 See In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the
Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 Ed 1488, 1502-15 (1 ith Cir. 1986), superseded
by statute, z8 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. 2005), as recognized in In re McBryde, 12o E3d 519, 524 (5th
Cir. 1997); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders, 83 E
Supp.2d 135, 151-56 (D.C. Cir. I999), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 264 F3d 52 (D.C. Cir.
zooI); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the U.S., 593 E Supp. 1371, 1379-85 (D.C. Cic. 1984),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 770 Ed 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
39 See McBryde, 83 F Supp.2d at 164-65.
40 See In re Certain Complaints, 783 Ed at 15o-15; McBryde, 83 E Supp. 2d at I51-
71; Hastings, 593 F. Supp. at 1378-85. The district court in McBryde found that the Act's
confidentiality provision, as applied, operated as a prior restraint on Judge McBryde's freedom
of speech, and granted relief on that single ground. See McBryde, 83 F Supp. 2d at 171-78.
41 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 82-86 (1970). Chandler
involved a writ of mandamus challenging the constitutional challenge to the Act's predecessor,
a 1939 statute establishing administrative councils of federal judges within the judiciary
empowered to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of
the business of the courts within its circuit." Id. at 76 n.i (citing 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2008)). The
Court denied the writ and declined to rule on the merits, noting that the petitioner, a district
court judge, should have sought relief first "from either the Council or some other tribunal."
Id. at 87.
42 See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 24, at 999.
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1). Congress first established judicial councils in 1939 to ensure
"that the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously transacted." Act of
Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (1939) (originally codified at 28
U.S.C. § 448). Nine years later, Congress revised and recodified the statute. The new version
required the judicial councils to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
2oo8-2oo9]
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of the judicial council are charged with disciplining their colleagues, a
power that includes the ability to investigate complaints of misconduct
by obtaining written statements from the parties, holding hearings, and
subpoenaing witnesses.44 If the council finds that a judge has committed
misconduct, it can impose a range of sanctions that include public or private
reprimands, suspensions from the bench, and requests that the offender
take early retirement.45 The list is illustrative, not exhaustive; the statute
explicitly leaves the fashioning of any particular sanction to the judicial
council's discretion.'
A complaint accusing a federal judge of misconduct may be filed by
anyone-a litigant, another judge, a politician, or a member of the public
with no obvious connection to the matter.47 The complaint must be in
writing and contain supporting facts. 48 The statute strictly limits the type
of judicial conduct about which one may legitimately complain, however. A
judge cannot be disciplined for making an unpopular decision, a misguided
decision, or even a series of decisions that are plainly wrong as a matter of
law. Potential relief from these kinds of errors is available only through
standard appellate review. Because many of the people who file complaints
against judges fail to note this distinction, the vast majority of grievances
are dismissed outright.
49
To qualify as misconduct cognizable under the statute, the complained-
of misbehavior must be "prejudicial to the... expeditious administration of
the business of the courts."5 Congress has defined this term to include
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit." In re McBryde, 117 F.3d zo8,
226 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332). The statute remained unchanged until the
passage of the Act. See id. Minor revisions were adopted in 199o, and in 2002, Congress
enacted the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, which recodified parts of the statute and
"further revised the provisions governing the handling of complaints against judges, primarily
by codifying some of the procedures adopted by the judiciary through rulemaking." Arthur D.
Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes and the Brnyer Committee
Report, z8 JusT. Sys. J. 426, 427 (2007).
44 28 U.S.C. §§ 352(a), 353(a), (c), 356,358 (2oo8).
45 Id. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i),(iii)-(B)(ii).
46 See id. § 354(a)(1)(C), (a)(2) (stating that the judicial council "shall take such action as
is appropriate" in response to finding of judicial misconduct and characterizing the sanctions
listed in the statute as "possible actions").
47 See id. § 351(a). If judicial misconduct comes to the attention of the chief judge
outside of this formal channel, through, for example, an anonymous source who does not wish
to become involved in the process, the chief judge is permitted, in his or her discretion, to
"identify" the misconduct and investigate it even though no written complaint was filed. See
id. § 351(b).
48 Seeid. § 351(a).
49 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 123 ("[Ailmost all [misconduct]
complaints are dismissed by the chief judge; 88% of the reasons given for dismissal are that
the complaint relates to the merits of a proceeding or is unsubstantiated.").
50 z8 U.S.C. § 351(a).
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"willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform
duties of the office, habitual intemperance, and other conduct . . . that
brings the judicial office into disrepute."51 Other examples include using
the judicial office to benefit relatives and friends, taking bribes, engaging
in ex parte communication with litigants, and engaging in conduct off the
bench that reasonably tends to lower the public's respect for the judiciary
as a whole."2
A complaint alleging judicial misconduct is reviewed first by the chief
judge of the circuit, who may dismiss it outright if the accusations are
plainly unfounded or relate solely to the substance of a ruling. The chief
judge may also dismiss the complaint by finding it mooted by "intervening
events" or resolved by "appropriate corrective action." 3 Corrective action
is defined broadly to include any voluntary redress on the judge's part that
"acknowledges and remedies the problems raised by the complaint."
In deciding whether dismissal is appropriate, the Act permits the
chief judge to "conduct a limited inquiry," which may include reviewing
any relevant transcripts and other court documents, or seeking a written
response from the accused judge.5 The Act makes clear, however, that
the chief judge may not act as a factfinder at this preliminary stage. 6 If
the complaint alleges misconduct based on facts "reasonably in dispute,"5 7
the chief judge must appoint a "special committee" to conduct a further
investigation. 8 The committee, which is made up of the chief judge and
"equal numbers of circuit and district judges," 9 has wide latitude to conduct
"an investigation as extensive as it considers necessary."6 In addition to
having subpoena power, the committee is authorized to conduct interviews,
obtain written statements, or compel live testimony at a hearing.
61
At the conclusion of its investigatory proceedings, the committee
is required to submit a "comprehensive report" of its findings and
recommendations to the Judicial Council. 6 The Judicial Council must
review the report and either dismiss the complaint, conduct further
51 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 9 (1979), reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4323.
52 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 3(h)
(2oo8).
53 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(I)-(2).
54 RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. I I(d)(2)
(2008).
55 See z8 U.S.C. § 352(a).
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 28 U.S.C. § 353 (a)(i).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 353(c).
61 28 U.S.C. § 356(a), 358(b).
62 28 U.S.C. § 353(c).
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investigation, or find that misconduct has occurred and mete out
punishment.63 If the Judicial Council concludes that the judge is guilty of
misconduct that may constitute grounds for impeachment, it must notify
the Judicial Conference, which is the judiciary's national policymaking
and disciplinary body.64 If the Judicial Conference concurs in the council's
conclusion, "it shall so certify and transmit the determination and the
record of proceedings to the House of Representatives for whatever action
the House of Representatives considers to be necessary."
6
The Act provides both the accused judge and the complainant with
avenues for appellate review. If the chief judge dismisses the complaint,
the dismissal order may be appealed to the Judicial Council, which assesses
the complaint independently.66 If the Judicial Council denies the petition
for review, the chief judge's order becomes final. 67 Any other action by the
Judicial Council, from dismissal to discipline, may be appealed by either
party to the Judicial Conference.' The new Rules enacted by the judiciary
empower the Judicial Conference on Conduct and Disability, sua sponte,
to take up the question of whether a special committee should have been
appointed to further explore a misconduct allegation, regardless of whether
this determination was the subject of an appeal. 69
The Act contains a strict confidentiality provision. With limited
exceptions, "all papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to
investigations conducted under this chapter shall be confidential and shall
not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding."70 While dismissal and
disciplinary orders must be made public eventually, there is a built-in time
delay: all orders remain sealed until a decision becomes final, meaning that it
is no longer subject to appeal or pending review.7' Months, even years, may
go by before the public can view the written decision.7" Special Committee
63 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1)(A)-C), (a)(2)(A)-(B).
64 See id. § 354(b)(2)(A)-(B). The members of the National Judicial Conference are the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the thirteen chief judges of the courts of appeals, twelve
district court judges, and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade. See Wheeler &
Katzmann, supra note 3o, at 1159.
65 28 U.S.C. 355(b)(I).
66 See z8 U.S.C. § 352(c).
67 See id.
68 See 28 U.S.C. § 357(a).
69 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL--CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DIsABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 2 I(b)(2)
(2oo8). The commentary to Rule 21 states that the changes "are intended to fill a jurisdictional
gap as to review of dismissals or conclusions of complaints." Id. at R. 21 cmt.
70 28 U.S.C. § 36o(a).
71 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDIcIAL-DIABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 24(a)
(2oo8).
72 The Rca/case is one such example. More than thirteen months elapsed between the
Ninth Circuit judicial council's decision to sanction Real for misconduct in November, 2oo6
and the publication of that decision in January, 2oo8.
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reports, testimony, affidavits, and other documentary evidence forming the
bases for a disciplinary decision remain sealed. unless the accused judge
gives permission to unseal them. 3 The lack of a public record in nearly
every judicial misconduct case suggests that permission is rarely granted.
2. Legislative History.-Congress's overriding concern in passing the Act
was promoting the public's interest in an honest and accountable judiciary.74
Judicial interests-individual and institutional-were subordinate to
ensuring that citizen complaints against federal judges were taken seriously
and handled fairly.7" Congress characterized poor behavior by federal judges
as infrequent but not unheard of, and concluded that judicial misconduct,
left unremedied, shamed the branch as a whole. 6 While anticipating that
the need for judicial self-discipline would be rare, Congress also expected
that the exceptional case would be met with an appropriately severe
response, using the procedures provided for in the Act.
At the same time, Congress expressed a clear preference for remedying
judicial misconduct with rehabilitative rather than punitive measures.
The legislative history stressed that most complaints would be handled
within the home circuit, and that "informal, collegial resolution of the
great majority of meritorious disability or disciplinary matters is to be
the rule rather than the exception."7 " Left unaddressed was the inherent
tension between allowing "the great majority of meritorious" misconduct
complaints to conclude without any real consequences for the judge and
creating a disciplinary system designed "to assure the public that valid
citizen complaints are being considered in a forthright and just manner."7 9
73 z8 U.S.C. § 36o(a)(3).
74 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 13 (1979), reprintedin 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4327 ("The
foremost and primary obligations of the whole judicial disability and disciplinary system are
the protection of the public and the administration of justice.").
75 See NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 4 (1993) (stating that Congress was "principally concerned
with assuring public accountability in the 198o Act").
76 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 5 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4319
("There have been documented instances and allegations of judicial misconduct, however,
that do not rise to the level of the constitutional prescription found in Article II, Section 4, but
which do bring the federal judiciary into disrepute.").
77 See 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4319-21. Signing the bill into law in the fall of I98o, then-
President Jimmy Carter praised the Act as an effective disciplinary mechanism that left the
balance of power undisturbed because "only Federal judges are involved in the process."
Alex Brauer & Tyng Loh, Judicial Misconduct, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963, 980 (200I). At
the same time, Carter promised that the statute provided a way for the average citizen to
participate and "be confident that a complaint filed under this system will receive fair and
serious attention throughout the process." Id.
78 S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3-4 (1979), reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4317.
79 I98O U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4321.
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Congress's failure to address this tension laid the groundwork for the
problems in the Act's enforcement that followed.
3. Judicial Interpretation of the Act.-Congress vested the judiciary with the
power to design internal rules to interpret and implement the Act.s° In 1986,
a special committee of the Judicial Conference drafted a set of non-binding
procedures called Illustrative Rules, which most circuit councils adopted
with few changes.8 1 In March of 2008, the Judicial Conference adopted
the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings to
create "authoritative interpretive standards" and made them binding
on all circuit courts.8" Both the Illustrative Rules and the binding Rules
express a preference for non-punitive resolutions in judicial misconduct
cases. Citing an "implicit understanding that voluntary self-correction or
redress of misconduct ... is preferable to sanctions," 83 the mandatory Rules
encourage the chief judges of each circuit to "facilitate this process [of self-
correction] by giving the subject judge an objective view of the appearance
of the judicial conduct in question and by suggesting appropriate corrective
measures."
' 4
The Rules' focus on self-correction is also apparent in the allocation
of procedural rights. While the Act itself is not explicit on the subject, the
legislative history reveals that Congress intended "that the court will give
serious consideration to providing the complainant with same rights that are
provided to the judge against whom a complaint has been filed. '85 But the
Rules do not treat the parties equally.86 Unlike the judge, the complainant
has no right to present evidence, to be present at a hearing to investigate
the complaint, or to review the report of the special committee.8 7 These
rights are afforded or denied the complainant at the sole discretion of the
special committee.
8
The case law interpreting the Act is generally consistent with the
non-punitive philosophy of the Rules. A long line of precedent holds that
8o See id. at 4316.
81 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. I cmt.
(zoo8) (citing the ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
AND DISABILITY (1986)). The Illustrative Rules were revised in 2ooo, but continued to be
nonbinding. Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal
JudicialMisconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POCv 325, 327 n.io (zoo8).
82 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. I cmt.
(2oo8).
83 Id. at R. I I cmt.
84 Id.
85 S. REP. No. 96-362, at 14 (1979), reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4328.
86 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 15 and
16 (2oo8).




"correcting" judicial misconduct without punishment is consistent with the
Act's purpose, which is "essentially forward-looking and not punitive." 9
As an explanation for placing the accused judge and the complainant
on unequal footing, these decisions also emphasize that misconduct
proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial in nature. 90
While arguably consistent with the statute's legislative history, the
judicial interpretation of the Act as an informal means to a rehabilitative
end contains a fundamental flaw of logic. It presumes that the twin goals of
judicial rehabilitation and judicial integrity are complementary when they
are often irreconcilable. Where egregious misconduct is met with little
consequence, legitimate suspicion arises that the disciplinary system has
failed in its most important goal: maintaining the integrity of the judiciary
by holding its members accountable for their bad behavior. The perception
that the judiciary has been insufficiently rigorous in enforcing the Act is
shared by some powerful members of Congress. These individuals have
argued for years that the intra-branch system of judicial discipline should
be replaced with an exterior form of oversight. Congressional criticism
of the judiciary's willingness to enforce the Act came to a climax over a
misconduct complaint filed against federal district court judge Manuel
Real.
III. 2003-2006: THE MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE REAL,
THE JUDICIARY'S HANDLING OF THE COMPLAINT, AND THE REPERCUSSIONS
A. The Misconduct Case Against Judge Real
In 2003, an attorney named Stephen Yagman filed a complaint under
the Act against federal district court judge Manuel Real. The judiciary's
handling of the complaint received significant attention from the press
and eventually, from Congress. The Real case became a lightening rod,
symbolizing defects in the Act's enforcement and galvanizing critics to
clamor loudly for the Act's overhaul. While no single misconduct case is
responsible for the recent attempts to do away with the Act, the Real case
was at the center of the controversy over its effectiveness and exerted a
uniquely powerful influence on subsequent attempts at reform. 9'
89 In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 9 E3d 1562, 1566 (U.S. Jud. Conf. Nov. 2,
1993); see also Hellman, supra note 43, at 427 (stating that the "Rules' rejection of a 'punitive'
purpose has been widely influential in the administration of the misconduct statutes").
(quotation marks in original).
90 In re Memorandum of Decision of Judicial Conf. Comm. on Judicial Conduct and
Disability, 517 F3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. Jud. Conf. 2oo8) (mem.).
91 See TR. Goldman, Representative Sensenbrenner Flexes His Muscle: Outgoing House
Judiciary Chairman Pushes for Judicial Impeachment Heating on California Federal Judge, LEGAL
TIMS, Sept. 25, 2oo6, at to ("If you were going to pick an alleged judicial-misconduct case to
use as an example of the federal judiciary's inability to investigate complaints against one of
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1. Disposition of the Complaint by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council.-The 2003
complaint focused on Real's actions on behalf of Deborah Maristina Canter,
a criminal defendant whom he sentenced to probation in 1999, following
her guilty plea to felony loan fraud and false statement charges. 92 Yagman
alleged that Real, while Canter was still his probationer, took control of
Canter's unrelated divorce and bankruptcy cases, and issued rulings to
benefit her after she asked for his help.93 He asked for an investigation
to determine the nature of the relationship between Real and Canter and
whether any misconduct occurred." Because Real was a judge in Los
Angeles, the complaint fell under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit
and was subject to initial review by the chief judge at that time, Mary M.
Schroeder.'
Canter's civil proceedings centered on a dispute over property.9
During their married life, Canter and her husband, Gary, had lived in a
home belonging to a trust established by Gary's parents. In February 1999,
two months before Canter was sentenced in her criminal case, Gary filed
for divorce and moved out of the house. % That summer, the trust filed
an unlawful detainer action to evict Canter.97 Canter responded by filing
for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the eviction proceedings. 98 In
January 2000, the bankruptcy judge, Alan Ahart, lifted the stay to allow
the eviction to go forward, and Canter agreed to leave her former in-laws'
home.99 Shortly after Ahart entered the order, Real took the bankruptcy case
away from him and assigned it to himself.'0 Twelve days later, Real stayed
Ahart's order, preventing the trust from enforcing the eviction agreement.",
its own, the case against Manuel Real would be difficult to ignore.").
92 See United States v. Deborah Maristina Canter, CR No. 98-576-R (W.D. Cal. June 2,
1998) (Judgment & Commitment Order).
93 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cit. Jud. Council
2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (attaching as an appendix Judicial Council Order, No. 03-
89037,425 F3d 1179, 1 I99 (9th Cir. Jud. Council Dec. 18, 2005)).
94 JudicialMisconduct, 425 E3d at 1 189. ("The gravaman of the complaint is that the judge
acted 'inappropriately,' a term that includes judicial acts based on ex parte communications and
the related misconduct that is amply demonstrated by this record.") (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(quotation marks in the original). Id. at 1188 n.5. The judicial council characterized Yagman's
complaint as follows: "Specifically, complainant alleges that the district judge acted improperly
in withdrawing the reference from the bankruptcy court and then re-imposing the automatic
stay that the bankruptcy court had vacated on the motion of certain creditors." Id. at 1199
(attaching as an appendix the Judicial Council Order, No. 03-89037, 425 E3d 1179' 1199 (9th
Cir. Jud. Council, Dec. 18, 2003)).
95 Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1184 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
96 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 5-6.
1oo See id. at 6-7.
ioi Judicial Misconduct, 425 E3d at 1184 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The trust filed a motion to vacate the stay, which Real denied. When asked
by the perplexed litigants to explain the reason for the denial, Real replied,
"Because I said it."
102
Yagman, a prominent and controversial civil rights lawyer, 103 had a
long-time adversarial relationship with Real and no direct involvement
in Canter's criminal or civil cases."° The basic facts underlying Yagman's
complaint were a matter of public knowledge; Canter's in-laws previously
had appealed Real's judicial actions to the Ninth Circuit and won a
reversal.105 In a 2002 opinion, the appellate court characterized as an abuse
of discretion Real's sua sponte, unexplained assumption of control over
Canter's bankruptcy case and his subsequent order prohibiting Canter's
eviction. 1 6 After finding that Real provided no notice or explanation to
the parties, the opinion concluded that Real's actions had "derailed" the
legal proceedings and "resulted in great delay and costs" to Canter's former
102 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
103 See, e.g., Jessica Garrison, L.A. Officials Know To Expect Attorney's Call, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2oo6, at Bi (characterizing Yagman's success in bringing lawsuits against the LAPD as
"legendary" and stating that Yagman "is also famous for making outrageous statements about
those in power" including calling the former police chief "the personification of evil" and
the former mayor an "Uncle Tom"). In 2oo6, Yagman was indicted on federal charges of tax
evasion, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering. See United States v. Stephen Yagman, 502
ESupp.2d Io84, Io86, 1O92 (D.C. Cal. 2007). The following year, Yagman was convicted on all
counts and sentenced to thirty-six months in prison. United States v. Stephan Yagman, No.
o6-227(A)-SVW (D.C. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order).
His appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit.
IO4 Yagman's adversarial relationship with Real began in the mid-i98os in Brown
v. Baden, a civil case brought by Yagman and presided over by Real. See Yagman v. Baden,
796 Ezd 1165, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1986). After a trial, in which Real and Yagamn "clashed"
repeatedly, Real ruled for the defendants and fined Yagman $250,000 for his "unreasonable
and vexatious conduct." Id. at 1181-82. Yagman appealed to the Ninth Circuit, claiming
that Real's "patent hostility" and his "one-sided and arbitrary" rulings constituted "tyranny
in its worst form." Id. at 1178. The appellate court upheld the verdict but reversed the fine,
characterizing it as "obviously inappropriate." Id. at 1 183-85, 1188. The court remanded
the case and ordered that it be assigned to a different judge "to preserve the appearance of
justice." Id. at 1188. Rather than reassign the case, Real directed the lawyers to brief the
legal question whether the Ninth Circuit had the authority to compel him to do so. Yagman
appealed a second time, and the Ninth Circuit again directed Real to reassign the case. Baden
v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 815 F.zd 575, 576-77 (9th
Cir. 1987). Real, through his attorney, appealed the Ninth Circuit's ruling to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which declined to hear the case. Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
In 1998, Real sanctioned Yagman in a different case, this time for engaging in "judge
shopping." Fields v. Gates, 233 F3d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir. zoo). As punishment, Real ordered
Yagman to "enroll in a course in legal ethics and professional responsibility given by an
accredited law school." Id. at 1175. Yagman appealed. On November 14, 20o, the Ninth
Circuit reversed Real's order. Id.
105 In re Canter v. Canter, 299 F3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
IO6 Id. at 1152, 1156.
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in-laws-35,000 in lost rental income, in addition to the expense of the
litigation itself.107
But the Ninth Circuit's opinion had not answered the two central
questions posed by Yagman's misconduct complaint: how did Real come
to learn of Canter's litigation with her in-laws, and why did he take such
extraordinary steps to assist her? Schroeder summarily dismissed the
complaint without addressing these issues, stating in a written order that
Yagman failed to support his misconduct allegations against Real with "any
objectively verifiable proof."'0" Shroeder also rejected Yagman's suggestion
that Real's decision to take over Canter's bankruptcy case was, in and of
itself, the proper basis for a finding of misconduct.'°9 Real's actions, Shroeder
concluded, were "directly related to the merits" of the civil litigation
between Canter and her former in-laws. n0 Because the Ninth Circuit had
already corrected Real's legal errors, no further action was needed."'
Yagman sought review of Schroeder's dismissal with the Judicial
Council. The Council, a panel consisting of five appellate judges and five
district court judges, directed a member of its staff to interview Canter's
bankruptcy attorney, Andrew Smyth, and his secretary."' Smyth stated
that his secretary, at Canter's suggestion and without Smyth's knowledge,
drafted a letter to Real asking him to help Canter avoid eviction. 13 Smyth's
secretary confirmed that she wrote the letter, which she said was delivered
to Real several days before he seized control of Canter's bankruptcy
case. According to Smyth's secretary, Canter said that "the letter had
'worked."' "4
The Council also asked Real to explain his actions. In a written
statement, Real responded that Canter had told him of her pending
divorce and imminent eviction during a meeting to discuss her progress on
probation."' He wrote: "[Canter] was contesting her right to occupancy
in the divorce court and I felt it should be finalized there so I re-imposed
the stay to allow the state matrimonial court to deal with her claim.""
6
107 Id. at 1154.




III See id. ("A complaint will be dismissed if it is directly related to the merits of a judge's
ruling or decision in an underlying case." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(a)(ii) (2oo8); RULES FOR
JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDIcIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 4(C)(1)(2008))).
112 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d 179,i 189 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 1200 (attaching as an Appendix the Judicial Council Order, No. 03-89037
(9th Cir. Jud. Council Dec. 18, 2003)).
114 Id.
115 Seeid. at II86.
116 See id. at 1199-1200 (quoting from Real's written response).
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According to Real, Canter's attorney had "abandoned her interest," thus
leaving her effectively unrepresented in the housing dispute."7
A majority ofthe Judicial Council found that Real's explanation confirmed
what Yagman had alleged: Real had taken over Canter's bankruptcy case
"and entered an order in that case based on information he obtained ex
parte from an individual who benefited directly from that order.""' 8 "That
[Real] believed that his actions would help his probationer's rehabilitation
is of no consequence," the Council stated."9 "A judge may not use his
authority in one case to help a party in an unrelated case."'' 0
The undisputed facts established a violation of the Code of Conduct
for federal judges, which forbids them from making decisions on the
basis of ex parte communications.'' This ethical violation resulted in a
series of judicial decisions that the Ninth Circuit had previously found
to be obstructive, legally baseless, and harmful to the Canter trust.' It
thus appeared that Real was guilty of misconduct because, in the words
of the Act, he had "engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts."'2 3 Yet the Judicial
Council did not make that finding, stating that "[w]e need not decide
whether that line was crossed in this case. We hold only that the Chief
Judge erred in dismissing the complaint as frivolous or unsubstantiated;
it is plainly neither."'2 4 On December 18, 2003, the Council sent the case
back to Schroeder, advising her to delve deeper into the allegations made
by Smyth and his secretary2
Schroeder sent Real a copy of the Council's order and asked him to
respond. In a memorandum, Real denied receiving a letter from Canter
but provided an explanation for his actions that differed significantly from
the one he'd offered previously.2 6 In this new explanation, Real stated
that he took control of Canter's bankruptcy case out of concern that her
confidential pre-sentence report, prepared by the probation department in
117 Id. at 1200.
I18 Id. at 1201. The council decision was split 6-4. All five appellate court judges joined
the majority, as did San Francisco Federal District Court Judge Marilyn Patel. The four
judges in the minority were all district court judges. SeeJudicial Council Order, No. 03-89037
(9th Cir. Jud. Council Dec. 18, 2003) (attached as an appendix to In re Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct, 425 F3d 1179, 1199--1203 (9th Cir. Jud. Council zoo5)).
I i9 Judicial Misconduct, 425 E3d at 1201.
120 Id.
121 See MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (zooo), available at www.uscourts.gov/
guide/volz/ch i.html.
122 In re Canter v. Canter, 299 F3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
123 z8 U.S.C. § 35 i(a) (2oo8).
124 Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1201 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (attaching as an
appendix the Judicial Council Order, No. 03-89037 (9 th Cir. Jud. Council Dec. 18, 2003)).
125 Id. at 119o.
126 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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her criminal case, had been filed impermissibly as a public exhibit by the
attorneys for her former in-laws.
2 7
On November 4, 2004, Schroeder dismissed the complaint for a
second time.2 8 The chief judge concluded that there was no evidence
of any "secret meetings or communications" between Canter and Real,
and that Real's newly provided explanation for his actions was "arguably
legitimate."' 9 Schroeder's order did not address the diametrically opposed
account of events provided by Smyth and his secretary. In accepting Real's
version, she implicitly resolved the credibility dispute in his favor. 30 Nor
did Schroeder's order contend with Real's previous statement to the judicial
council that he had taken over the bankruptcy case after Canter told him of
her imminent eviction during a private meeting to discuss her progress on
criminal probation.
Once again, Yagman sought review with the Judicial Council. This time,
the judicial council sided with Schroeder, declining to overturn her "factual
finding" that no improper communication between Real and Canter had
occurred.' 3 ' Turning to Real's acknowledged ex parte contact with Canter,
the council wrote that this issue had been redressed by the Ninth Circuit
in its decision reversing the judicial actions that Real had taken. 32 In the
majority's view, there was no need to find Real guilty of misconduct because
he had taken "appropriate corrective action" under the Act by submitting a
letter in which he admitted "improper conduct" and made a "pledge not to
repeat it."' 33 The "pledge" consisted of a letter written by Real's lawyers,
which stated that Real should have explained his actions in the Canter case
at the outset so that "misunderstandings by the parties could have been
prevented," and added, "[h]e does not believe that any similar situation
will occur in the future. ' 4
Accompanying the majority's opinion was a far lengthier dissent
written by Judge Kozinski, who argued that his colleagues ignored strong
evidence of misconduct and failed to follow the procedures set forth in
the statute. 3 He pointed out that the Act expressly prohibits the chief
judge from making "findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably
in dispute."' 36 By resolving the irreconcilable accounts of the nature of
the ex parte contact in Real's favor, Kozinski argued, the chief judge had
127 See id. at 13.
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 See Judicial Misconduct, 425 E3d at 119 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at i18I (majority opinion).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1181-82.
135 Id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1190. 28 U.S.C. § 352(a)(2) (2oo8).
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overstepped her statutory authority. Rather than correct this legal error, the
council had exacerbated it by accepting this unauthorized conclusion. 37
Kozinski also took the majority to task for its conclusion that Real's
"other impropriety"-his admission that he had acted based on information
provided by Canter in a private meeting-had been redressed by the
appellate court. 3 That determination, he argued, suffered from a similar
misreading of the Act, which was designed to address inappropriate behavior
rather than errors of legal reasoning.'39 As the Council itself noted in its
previous order remanding the Real misconduct complaint: "[Wihere the
complainant presents solid evidence that the judge's ruling was the result of
'conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts,' 28 U.S.C. § 351 (a), then such underlying conduct
will not be deemed 'directly' related to the merits of the ruling."'14 The
Council, it appeared, was ignoring not just the requirements of the statute,
but its own precedent construing those requirements.
The Council's determination that Real had taken "appropriate
corrective action" was yet another flawed application of the law, according
to Kozinski.' 41 Under the Act, "corrective action" is deemed "appropriate"
when the offending judge, of his own volition, makes amends, usually by
admitting the misconduct and promising not to do it again. 4 In Kozinski's
view, Real had not apologized or acknowledged making a mistake. 43 His
lawyer-drafted statement said only that he should have provided a better
explanation of his actions to avoid "misunderstandings."' 44 Real had not
explained what "misunderstandings" a more thorough explanation might
have corrected, or promised not to repeat his behavior; his statement said
only that history was unlikely to repeat itself.'4 This, Kozinski said, was
"hardly a commitment to act differently in similar circumstances."
'146
137 Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1192 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
138 Seeid. at 1193-94.
139 See id. at 1193.
140 Id. at 1200 (attaching as an appendix Judicial Council Order No. 03-89037 (9th Cit.
Jud. Council Dec. 18, 2003)).
141 Id. at 1194-97.
142 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 244-45.
143 See Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that Real
"steadfastly refuses to admit any wrongdoing");seealso REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORTSUpra
note 5, at 14 (quoting from the letter written to the judicial council by Real's attorneys).
144 REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
145 See Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Nor does the
judge's statement contain a pledge not to repeat his wrongful conduct."); REAL SPECIAL
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 (quoting from the letter written to the judicial council
by Real's attorneys).
146 See Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Kozinski's dissent made waves, attracting the attention of reporters,
politicians, and experts in judicial ethics.1 47 By exposing the legal errors in
the majority's opinion and highlighting the uncontested facts establishing
Real's improper conduct, Kozinski made a strong argument that the council
majority's failure to find misconduct or impose punishment amounted to
an abandonment of its disciplinary responsibilities. Indeed, Kozinski went
further, arguing that the majority's opinion was not a misreading of the
statute but a misalignment of priorities: his colleagues were concerned
primarily with sparing Real's feelings and reputation rather than enforcing
the rules.'48 The straightforward language of the Act and Real's admitted
ex parte communication offered support for this conclusion, and many
people looking in on the judiciary from the outside agreed with it.
149
2. Ruling of the Judicial Conference.-Yagman appealed the dismissal to
the Judicial Conference. In October 2005, while his appeal was pending,
Yagman filed a second misconduct complaint against Real, accusing him
of misleading the Judicial Council by offering inconsistent explanations
for taking over Canter's bankruptcy case. The 2005 complaint went to
Schroeder for review, where it lay dormant for seven months.15
The Judicial Conference delegated review of the 2003 complaint to a
committee of five judges.15 1 OnApril 28,2006, bya vote of 3-2, the committee
voted to uphold the Council's dismissal on procedural grounds, finding that
the Ninth Circuit's failure to appoint a special committee prevented it from
reaching the merits. 52 According to the majority, the failure of the chief
judge and judicial council to follow the Act's procedures rendered their
substantive rulings unreviewable.' s3 Only Congress, through the passage
of "additional legislation," could solve the jurisdictional problem.'
The two dissenters protested that while the statute did not expressly
provide for jurisdiction where the complaint was dismissed without the
appointment of a special committee, jurisdiction was implied in such
cases.' To conclude otherwise created a perverse result, legitimizing a
147 See infra notes 16o-i64 and accompanying text.
148 See Judicial Misconduct, 425 E3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority had failed in its responsibility to "maintain public confidence in the judiciary
by ensuring that substantial allegations of misconduct are dealt with forthrightly and
appropriately" by focusing on "not hurting the feelings of the judge in question").
149 See infra notes 170-172, and accompanying text.
15o REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
151 See In fr Opinion of Judicial Conference Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct
and Disability Orders, 449 F3d io6, 1o6-07 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2oo6).
152 Seeid. at Io9.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id. at I 11-12 (Winter, J., joined by Dimmick, J., dissenting).
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decision by "those closest to an accused colleague to dismiss a complaint
by actions that ignore statutory procedures and simultaneously render the
tribunal of final review impotent."5 6
B. Repercussions
1. Press Coverage and Public Reaction.-In accordance with the Act's
confidentiality provisions, Real was not publicly named as the target of the
complaint during the nearly three years that the misconduct proceedings
were ongoing."s7 Because he was never found to have done anything wrong,
he remained anonymous in the final order as well. 5 ' But while Real's name
did not appear in the disciplinary orders and dissents published by the
judiciary, the Ninth Circuit's 2002 decision identified him as the district
court judge who had abused his discretion in seizing control of Canter's
bankruptcy case. 159 Because the disciplinary orders discussed the Canter
litigation in detail, itwas easy to connect Real to the misconduct proceedings.
The extraordinary facts of the complaint and its handling by the judiciary
made the case newsworthy, and it received significant media coverage at
every turn in the proceedings. 16° When the complaint was dismissed by
the Judicial Council, the portions of Kozinski's dissent describing Real's
behavior and castigating his colleagues for excusing it were quoted at length
in the press.161 Articles reporting the Judicial Conference decision affirming
156 See id. at II o--I I.
157 See 28 U.S.C. § 36o(a)-(b) (2oo8); see RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-
DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 23(a) (2oo8), ("The consideration of a complaint by the chief
judge, a special committee, the judicial council, or the Judicial Conference Committee on
Judicial Conduct and Disability is confidential.").
158 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDIcIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R.
24(a)(I) (2oo8) (stating that "if a complaint is finally dismissed under Rule ii(c) without
the appointment of a special committee, or if it is concluded under Rule I I(d) because of
voluntary corrective action, the publicly available materials must not disclose the name of the
subject judge without his or her consent.").
159 See In re Canter v. Canter, 299 F3d 1150, 1151 (9th Cit. 2004).
16o See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Judge May Face Sanctions: Federal Jurist Improperly Took
Over Bankruptcy Case, Judicial Panel Says, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. I8, 2004, at BI (describing Real as
"cantankerous and peremptory on the bench" and characterizing the judicial council's order
remanding the misconduct complaint to the chief judge as unusual because "[m]ore than 99%
of complaints filed against federal judges around the country are dismissed out of hand");
Justin Scheck, Kozinski Blasts L.A. Judge In Discipline Case, SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, Oct.
3, 2005, at I (describing the misconduct complaint, its dismissal by the judicial council, and
Judge Kozinski's "withering 39-page dissent"); Henry Weinstein, Complaint Against Judge Has
Broader Ramifications: Judicial Panel Says It Lacks Power To Sanction L.A. Jurist; Bill Would
Create Inspector General, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2006, at B3 (reporting that the National Judicial
Conference had affirmed the dismissal of the misconduct complaint, which "could influence
legislation proposed by conservatives seeking to exert greater influence over the judiciary").
i61 See Henry Weinstein, LA. Judge Avoids Sanctions by Panel, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,2005, at
B I; Scheck, supra note 16o; Kenneth Olang, Ninth Circuit Panel Tosses Misconduct Case Against
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the Council's dismissal also focused on the dissent, and the experts who
weighed in agreed that the two majority opinions were not simply wrong
but harmful to the judiciary's reputation. 161 One law professor described
the case this way: "Judges ignore the procedures that the law requires with
the result that a fellow judge avoids the possibility of discipline, and then
a panel of higher judges says that it has no power to review the violation ..
.To the public, it may look like a system designed by the Mad Hatter with
the rest of us in the role of Alice."
163
2. ProposedLegislation.-The dismissal of the misconduct complaint against
Real angered some members of Congress, who used it as a platform to argue
that the intra-branch system of discipline needed to be supplemented or
replaced with an outside monitor. 164 To these individuals, chief among them
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), then the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, the Real case validated what they had said all along-that the
judicial policing system was a good-old-boys network more concerned
with self-protection than self-discipline.
Sensenbrenner had long been dissatisfied with the judiciary's
enforcement of the Act. 165 In 2002, he filed his own misconduct complaint
against a federal judge, and labeled its subsequent dismissal by the judiciary
a "whitewash." 166 In a meeting with members of the Judicial Conference
in 2004, Sensenbrenner predicted that Congress would "begin assessing
whether the disciplinary authority delegated to the judiciary has been
responsibly exercised and ought to continue."1 67  In 2005, Sensenbrenner
and Senator Grassley introduced legislation to replace the intra-branch
disciplinary system with an Inspector General mandated "to take
complaints, prepare reports, and audit and investigate the administration
Manuel Real, MET. NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Los Angeles), Oct. 3, 2005, at I available at www.
metnews.com/articles/Zoo5/real I 003o5.htm.
16z See Weinstein, Judge May Face Sanctions, supra note 16o, at B i (reporting that in 2004,
"[flour legal experts, after reading the council's [remand] order and related material, said
further action against Real was warranted" and quoting one professor as saying that Real had
engaged in "the antithesis of impartial judging").
163 Weinstein, Complaint AgainstJudge Has Broader Ramifications, supra note I6o (quoting
NYU Law School Professor Stephen Gillers).
164 See Renee Montagne & Nina Totenberg, NPR Morning Edition, July 24, 2006,
available at 2oo6 WL 22945546 ("Last week, [Representative Sensenbrenner] called for the
impeachment of a federal judge here in California who is accused of unethical conduct, and
last spring he proposed legislation to create a judicial inspector general. It's an idea that is
anathema to most federal judges.").
165 See Christensen, supra note 8, at 98.
i66 Id.
167 E James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Remarks Before the
U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary
(Mar. 16, 2004) (transcript available at http://judiciaryhouse.gov/legacy/newso3 16o4.htm).
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of the courts." 168 Included in this broad grant of authority was the power to
investigate misconduct complaints against federal judges and report them
to Congress. 169 The bill failed to pass in either house.
For Sensenbrenner and some of his colleagues in Congress, the manner
in which the judiciary handled-or, in their view, "bungled"-the Real
complaint provided new fuel for the cause. 170 In late April 2006, several
months after the Judicial Conference ruling, Sensenbrenner and Grassley
once again introduced a bill to create an Inspector General authorized to
investigate misconduct complaints against judges and report any findings
of misconduct to the Justice Department. 7' Testimony in support of the
bill, titled the Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enforcement Act, discussed
in detail the judiciary's handling of the Real misconduct complaint and
argued that it "both makes the case for reform, and pleads for statutory
changes."' 7
168 See Mike Allen, GOP Seeks More Curbs on Courts: Sensenbrenner Proposes an Inspector
General, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at A3.
169 See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrenner, Grassley, Introduce Legislation Establishing Inspector General for the
Judicial Branch (Apr. 27, 2oo6), available at http://judiciary.house.gov.
17o Representative Sensenbrenner Issues Statement on Judicial Conference's Report on
Implementation of Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of sp8o, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 19, 2006,
available at 2oo6 WLNR 16313584 ("Today's report finds the Judicial Branch bungled all
of the matters [including the Real complaint] in which the House Judiciary Committee
conducted extensive oversight."). See also Weinstein, Complaint Against Judge Has Broader
Ramifications, supra note I6o ("A long-running controversy involving a misconduct complaint
against veteran Los Angeles federal judge Manuel L. Real has reached the nation's capital,
where it could influence legislation proposed by conservatives seeking to exert greater
oversight of the federal judiciary."); Bruce Moyer, Inspector General Bills Rile Judiciary, 53 JUN.
FED. LAW Io (2006) (quoting Sensenbrenner as stating that Inspector General legislation was
necessary because "[piress accounts and Government Accountability Office reports indicate
that the federal Judiciary's self-policing is not up to snuff"); G.M. Filisko, SomeSystem Failure
in U.S. Judge Oversight, 5 No. 39 ABA J. E-Report 2 (Sept. 29, 2006) (reporting that the Real
case "may have contributed to Sensenbrenner's introduction of a bill in April calling for an
Inspector General to oversee the federal courts").
171 See Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5219, io9th
Cong. (2006); S. 2678, io9th Cong. The bill did not specify whether the Inspector General was
intended to replace the Chief Judge and the judicial councils as the judiciary's disciplinary
arm or work in conjunction with them. See Hearing on H.R. 5219 Before the Subcomm. On Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security ofthe H. Comm. On the Judiciary, I o9th Cong. (zoo6) (statement
of Professor Arthur D. Hellman (voicing support for the legislation but noting that it failed to
"explain how the functions of the new Office would be integrated into the existing statutory
structure for dealing with complaints against judges")).
172 Hearing on H.R. 5219 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security




3. Judicial Response.-The renewed effort to pass legislation creating an
Inspector General elicited a condemning response from the judiciary.
1 73
Press accounts reported "widespread alarm" among federal judges that
the bill, if enacted into law, would threaten their independence. 74 Many
believed that shifting the authority to discipline judges to Congress and the
executive branch raised the specter of judicial sanctions based on politically
unpopular decisions rather than objective determinations of misconduct."'
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Associate Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg described the bill as "a really scary idea" bringing to mind
totalitarian regimes like that of the former Soviet Union.
76
But while the Inspector General proposal met with a cool reception,
there had been a previous acknowledgment at the judiciary's highest
levels that the disciplinary system needed to be reviewed and, potentially,
reformed. In May 2004, soon after Sensenbrenner first went public with
his concerns about the effectiveness of judicial self-policing,'77 then-Chief
Justice Rehnquist formed a committee "to evaluate and report on the way
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is being implemented."' 78
This initiative, Rehnquist stated, was undertaken in response to "criticism
by members of Congress," as part of an ongoing effort to improve what
had become a strained relationship between the judicial and legislative
173 See Moyer, supra note 17o, at io; Montagne & Totenberg, supra note 164.
174 See Moyer, supra note 17o, at o.
175 See Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. I, 7-8 (2oo6) (stating that "judges have good cause for concern"
about the threat to their independence posed by Sensenbrenner's Inspector General
bill); Hon. Carolyn Dineen King, Challenges to Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: A
Perspective from the Circuit Courts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 772-73 (2oo7) (stating that "%j udicial
independence is undermined" by proposals, like Sensenbrenner's, to create an Inspector
General); Hon. Lawrence L. Piersol, The Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society, 52 S.D.
L. REv. 444,450 (2007) (describing Sensenbrenner's Inspector General bill as "extreme"); see
also Howard J. Bashman, Editorial, Policing the Bench, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 19,
zoo6, at 4 (describing critics of the Inspector General bill as concerned about infringement
on the separation of powers); Filisko, supra note 170 (quoting NYU School of Law Professor
Stephen Gillers as saying that the Inspector General Bill "is written broadly enough to allow
the inspector general to review decisions.... I think it's intended to whip federal judges into
line and rule by fear").
176 See Montagne & Totenberg, supra note 164; see also Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D.
Smith, Removing Federal Judges Without Impeachment, Ii 6 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95, 98 n.13
(2oo6).
177 See Goldman, supra note 91, at io (reporting that the Breyer Committee was
established "shortly after Sensenbrenner publicly questioned whether the judiciary should
continue to discipline itself"); Piersol, supra note 175, at 450 (outlining the judiciary's response
to the criticism of "Representative Sensenbrenner and others").
178 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(Jan. 1, 2005), at I, available at http://www.supremecourts.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-
endreport.pdf; see also BREYER COMMiTTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 z6.
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branches.'79 The group-chaired by Associate Justice Stephen Breyer and
known as the Breyer Committee-was still studying the issue when the
Inspector General legislation was introduced in April 2006.
Meanwhile, the disciplinary proceedings against Real began anew in
the Ninth Circuit. Less than a month after Sensenbrenner and Grassley
proposed the Inspector General legislation, Chief Judge Schroeder
responded to Yagman's second misconduct complaint against Real, which
he had filed seven months earlier. This time, Schroeder appointed a
Special Committee, and asked its members to investigate the allegations
that Real intentionally misled the Judicial Council by providing conflicting
explanations for his actions in the Canter bankruptcy case. 180 Because the
new misconduct allegations were inextricably bound up with the 2004
complaint, Schroeder directed the Committee to investigate that matter as
well.' 81 In August 2006, the Special Committee held a five-day hearing.
82
Eighteen witnesses testified under oath, and the Committee reviewed
more than 8500 pages of documents and 136 exhibits.'83
4. Impeachment Proceedings Against Judge Real.-For Sensenbrenner
and others in Congress, the judiciary's renewed inquiry into the Real
misconduct case was too little, too late. 1 4 On July 17, 2006, Sensenbrenner
introduced a resolution on the House floor "calling for an inquiry into
grounds for impeachment of U.S. District Judge Manuel L. Real, from the
Central District of California."'8 s  While Sensenbrenner acknowledged
that the misconduct allegations against Real were "under further review"
by the Judicial Council, his argument in support of a congressional
179 See Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 178, at I; see also Bruce Moyer, Judiciary
Installs Measures to Improve Ethics Accountability, 53 FED. LAWYER 8 (Dec. 2006) ("According to
press reports, Justice Breyer described his committee's work as a 'direct response' to criticism
about lapses in judicial discipline.").
I8o See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2-3 (quoting from Schroeder's
order). The Special Committee was made up of five members: Circuit Judge Susan P. Graber,
who presided, Circuit Judge Richard R. Clifton, District Court Judge Robert H. Whaley,
District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte, and Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder. See id. at I.
181 Id. at s.
182 The hearing took place on August 21, 22, 23, 24, and 29, zoo6, at the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Courthouse in Pasadena. Id. at 15.
183 Id. at 15-16.
184 Henry Weinstein & Moises Mendoza, Ethics Charges a Bidfor Revenge, U.S.Judge Says:
Jurist Manuel Real Tells House Panel that Attorney Stephen Yagman's Claims of Misconduct Stem from
a Personal Vendetta, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at B I ("Under fire, Mary M. Schroeder, the 9th
Circuit's chief judge, revived the inquiry [into the misconduct allegations] in May, ordering
a formal investigation. That did not deter Sensenbrenner from asking the [congressional]
subcommittee to hold its own hearing.").




impeachment inquiry made clear that he had little faith in the outcome of
that process.186
The hearing, which was held on September 21,2006, was an extraordinary
event. Unlike the private proceedings conducted by the judicial council
the month before, the congressional probe was open to the public and
broadcast live on the Internet.' Real, under subpoena, appeared with his
lawyers and testified before the House Judiciary Committee, which was
controlled by the Republicans and chaired by Sensenbrenner. ss
The members of the committee split along partisan lines in their
treatment of Real, revealing a sharp difference of opinion as to the
true purpose of the impeachment inquiry.'89 In the Democrats' view,
the Republicans were using the Real case to advance a broader agenda:
exercising control over judges whose opinions they disliked-particularly
judges in the Ninth Circuit where Real sat." ° The Republican members
of the Committee countered that they were obligated to explore the
misconduct allegations further because the Judicial Council had failed to
discharge its disciplinary responsibilities and a genuine issue existed as to
whether Real had committed an impeachable offense. 191 Throughout the
186 See id. (stating, "When the judicial branch has failed to address serious allegations of
judicial misconduct, as the Ninth Circuit arguably has in this matter, the Constitution provides
the Congress only one course of action: opening an impeachment inquiry.").
187 See Impeaching Manuel L. Real, A Judge of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal., for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on the Courts, the




189 See Goldman, supra note 9 1, at 1o (reporting on partisan split in view of impeachment
inquiry).
19o Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 187, at 47-48 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("[I]
believe we are here today because of the animosity felt by the [Republican] majority toward
the 9th Circuit, and that you are a victim of that animosity. And for that I apologize to you.").
The same week that the impeachment inquiry occurred, the Senate Judiciary Committee held
week-long hearings to determine whether to split the Ninth Circuit into two smaller circuits.
See Weinstein & Mendoza, supra note 184, at Bi. This proposal, which was generally favored
by Republicans and opposed by Democrats would, it was believed, weaken the influence
of liberal judges on the court whose opinions on issues like the capital punishment and the
Pledge of Allegiance had aroused great controversy in conservative circles. See id.; see also
Henry Weinstein, Breyer Commission Finds Handling of Probe Involving L.A. Jurist "Inconsistent"
With Law, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 2oo6, at B3 (describing the Real case as unfolding against "a
groundswell of voices calling for the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, a frequent target of
conservatives, to be split into two judicial districts, thus diluting its considerable influence and
power"); Debra Rosenberg, The War On Judges, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 23-25 (chronicling
efforts by Republican-led Congress to "curb judicial power").
191 See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 187, at io-i i (statement of Rep. Smith,
Member) ("Our goal here today is two-fold. First, we want to determine what actually
occurred when Judge Real presided over the Canter case in 2ooo and 2001. And second,
we need to learn more about existing impeachment precedents and whether they have
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hearing, Democratic members of the Committee expressed their view that
the impeachment proceedings were unnecessary in light of the Judicial
Council's ongoing investigation. 9 ' One even apologized to Real, calling him
a "victim."'93 The Republicans, by contrast, grilled Real about his handling
of the Canter case' 14 as well as on tangential subjects such as whether he
considered Canter "attractive" 195 and what he -made of the fact that he was
widely reviled as a jurist.91 Real emphatically denied any wrongdoing,
stating that he never had "an improper personal relationship with [Canter]"
and that Kozinski's conclusion to the contrary was "erroneous."'197 Real's
testimony was followed by two law professors with expertise in the field
of judicial conduct and ethics.' 98 While acknowledging that the judiciary
made serious errors in the Real misconduct case, both professors advised
the committee to wait until the conclusion of the disciplinary process
before taking further action. 99  They also agreed that, based on the
application to Judge Real's alleged behavior. None of us ... relishes this undertaking.... But
this is one of the few ways available to Congress to ensure that the Federal judiciary retains
its integrity and serves the public's interest."); see id. at 45 (statement of Rep. Cannon) ("What
we don't want are autocratic judges-judges that abuse their position. And a Federal judge
has massive authority. And so, I hope this case is one that we will revisit after we have a little
more information from the judicial council.").
192 See id. at i i (statement of Rep. Berman) (stating that "this congressional hearing on
the impeachment of Judge Real is premature" because the judicial council was in the process
of investigating his alleged misconduct); see id. at 33 (statement of Rep. Schiff) (repeating
Representative Berman's concerns); see also id. at 46-47 (statement of Rep. Waters); see also id.
at 87-88 (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
193 See id. at 47-48 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("[I] believe we are here today because
of the animosity felt by the [Republican] majority toward the 9th Circuit, and that you are a
victim of that animosity. And for that I apologize to you.").
194 See id. at 30-32 (statement of Rep. Issa) (asking Real, "Why in the world did you
choose to enrich [Canter] for $35,000 of value...?").
195 See id. at 40 (statement of Rep. Cannon).
196 See id. at 43 (statement of Rep. Cannon) (saying, "There are a lot of people that
dislike you, I take it.").
197 See id. at 15-16 (statement of Judge Real) (stating, "I am here today because a
complaint was made, accusing me of judicial misconduct in my handling of a bankruptcy case
more than 6 years ago. I am here to tell you that I categorically deny that I have committed
any misconduct in any aspect of that case."). Real repeated the secondary explanation that
he had offered the judicial council: he took control of Canter's bankruptcy case to ascertain
whether her confidential criminal pre-sentence report had been misused by opposing counsel
for her former in-laws. See id. at 17.
198 See id. at 51-54, 58-86. Canter's bankruptcy attorney, Andrew Smyth, also testified.
See id. at 54-58.
199 See id. at 51-52 (statement of Professor Arthur Hellman) (stating that, although the
Ninth Circuit previously failed to follow the procedures set forth in the Act, "the preferable
course of action is to suspend proceedings on H. Res. 916 until the special committee has
completed its work and the judicial council and/or Judicial Conference have acted upon its
report"); see id. at 60 (statement of Professor Charles Geyh) ("The best solution is to turn to
the judicial council, wait for them to be finished, and if, on the basis of their conclusions, you
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allegations, it did not appear that Real had committed a crime warranting
impeachment.2 0°
The hearing ended on an inconclusive note. The Committee did not
vote on Sensenbrenner's impeachment resolution or schedule any further
proceedings. 01
IV. REFORM FROM WITHIN: THE REPORT FROM THE BREYER COMMITTEE,
THE CONCLUSION OF THE REAL MISCONDUCT CASE, AND ADOPTION OF ITS
RECOMMENDED CHANGES BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
A. The Breyer Committee Repor
On September 19, 2006, the Breyer Committee issued a 180-page
report entitled Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980.02 The report was the culmination of a two-year study of misconduct
complaints designed to assess "whether the judiciary, in implementing the
Act, has failed to apply the Act as strictly as Congress intended, thereby
engaging in institutional favoritism." 0 3  Coincidentally, the Committee
issued its findings only two days before Real's impeachment hearing
before Congress-the most dramatic moment in the case that had become
shorthand for precisely this issue.2 01
The Breyer Committee gave the judiciary's enforcement of the Act
a mixed review.10 5  On the one hand, "chief circuit judges and judicial
councils are doing a very good overall job in handling complaints."0° Cases
say there is more evidence of an impeachable offense there, that is the time to go after it, not
before.").
2oo See id. at 52 (statement of Professor Arthur Hellman) (characterizing the grounds for
impeachment as only "marginally" in existence because there was no evidence that Real had
committed a crime); see id. at 60 (statement of Professor Charles Geyh) (stating that "I am a
little bit leery of saying" that Real's actions rose to the level of impeachable offenses).
2O See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System:
A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PrTr. L. REV. 189, 209 (2007).
202 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 116.
203 Id. at 119.
204 The Breyer Committee issued its report on September 20, 2006. See Henry
Weinstein, Breyer Commission Finds Handling of Probe Involving L.A. Jurist "Inconsistent" with
Law, L.A. TMES, Sept. 20, 2oo6, at B3("On the eve of a long-awaited congressional hearing
into the possible impeachment of a Los Angeles judge, a commission headed by U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Breyer said Tuesday that the federal appeals court in San Francisco had
bungled an investigation of 82-year-old jurist Manuel L. Real.").
205 See Nina Totenberg, U.S. Judiciary Agrees to Greater Transparency, NPR, Sept. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=61o8986 (reporting on the
release of the Breyer Committee Report and stating that "[tihe conclusion, was that, overall,
the current self-policing system works well, but not in the relatively few high visibility
cases").
2o6 BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 206.
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filed mainly by prisoners and disgruntled litigants were usually deemed
meritless,0 7 and cases were properly disposed of ninety-seven to ninety-
eight percent of the time."°8 On the other hand, the judiciary frequently
mismanaged high-profile complaints, many of which were filed by attorneys,
court personnel, or public officials.209 Between 2001-2005, the judiciary
received seventeen high-profile complaints and mishandled five, an error
rate of nearly thirty percent.2 10 The committee was blunt in its criticism of
the judiciary's record in these cases, calling the error rate "problematic"
and "far too high. 2 11 The mismanaged, high-profile misconduct cases
were a tiny fraction of the total,2 12 but because they involved substantial
allegations of wrongdoing and received attention from the media, they had
a disproportionate impact. 13 The public did not read about the hundreds of
frivolous complaints that the chief judges rejected out of hand each year. 14
But anyone with an Internet connection or a newspaper subscription
could readily familiarize herself with the Real complaint and the other
controversial misconduct cases covered by the press. The Committee
expressed concern that the substantial error rate in the handling of these
cases was fostering the perception that the system "may discourage those
with legitimate complaints from using the Act.
'2 1 s
The Breyer Committee Report devoted an entire section to discussing
the seventeen "high-visibility" complaints handled by the judiciary
between 2001 and 2005, examining in detail the five mishandled complaints
within this subset.216 But the report named no names; even where the
judge had waived confidentiality he remained anonymous. 17 In four of the
five mishandled cases, the committee determined that the breakdown in
the disciplinary process occurred at the initial stage of review because the
chief judge gave short shrift to the misconduct allegations by incorrectly
207 See id. at 123.
2o8 See id. at 122-23.
209 See id. at 122-23, 173.
210 See id. at 122.
211 Id. at 123.
212 See Hellman, The Regulation of JudicialEthics, supra note 201, at 217-18 (reporting that
between 6oo-8oo complaints are filed annually, ninety-five percent are dismissed by the chief
judge, and less than one percent result in the appointment of a special committee).
213 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 122-123 ("The proper handling
of high-visibility complaints has particular importance. Because the matters at issue have
received publicity, the public is particularly likely to form a view of the judiciary's handling of
all cases upon the basis of these few.").
214 See Id. at 123.
215 See id.
216 See id. at 149, 173 (discussing the mishandled high-profile cases in a thirty page
section entitled Disposition of High-Visibility Complaints).
217 See id. at 122-23; see also Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics, supra note 201, at
234 (criticizing the Breyer Committee's failure to disclose the names of the accused judges).
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resolving, or simply ignoring, disputed factual issues rather than appointing
a special committee to investigate them. 18 The 2003 Real misconduct
complaint was among this group.1 9 In assessing the defects in the Ninth
Circuit's handling of the matter, the committee's critique echoed Kozinski's
dissent, quoting from it several times.120 In the Committee's view, both the
chief judge and the Judicial Council were in error; the former for twice
dismissing substantial allegations of misconduct without appointing a
special committee and the latter for upholding the second dismissal.
2
Yet, nowhere in its analysis of the Real complaint or the other mishandled,
high-profile misconduct cases was there any mention of the committee's
central inquiry: Was institutional bias the root cause of the problems
affecting the Act's enforcement?22 Instead, the Committee speculated
that the error rate in the high-visibility complaints "may reflect the greater
complexity of such cases and less familiarity with their proper handling
as a result of their infrequent occurrence." ' 3 In essence, the Committee
concluded that the problem lay with the nature of the cases, not the nature
of the judges.2 4 Not surprisingly, the reforms proposed in the Committee's
report reflected that belief: to reduce the error rate, the Committee
advocated for an infusion of resources and training to clarify the distinct
roles of the chief judge and the Judicial Council in the disciplinary process
and to provide guidance in the carrying out of their respective duties.2 5
The only one of the Committee's recommendations to address the issue
of institutional bias did so indirectly and equivocally by suggesting that
218 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2oo.
219 See id. at 184-89. The high-visibility complaints were labeled C-i through C- 7.
The Real complaint was assigned the number C-7. Id. at 175-98.
220 See id. at i88.
221 See id. at 189 ("We believe that appointment of a special committee was called for
in the first instance, as the council's first order suggested but did not direct. Both chief judge
dismissals of the complaint appear inconsistent with the Act, as does the judicial council's
second order.").
222 Id. at 119 ("The basic question presented is whether the judiciary, in implementing
the Act, has failed to apply the Act strictly as Congress intended, thereby engaging in
institutional favoritism. This question is important not only to Congress and the public but
to the judiciary itself.").
223 Id. at 124.
224 The committee proposed a total of twelve reforms. Of those, ten were designed
to provide additional guidance to judges in interpreting the Act, to potential complainants
in invoking the Act, and to the press and public in understanding the Act. See id. at 2o8,
209, 217. Recommendation ii suggested "clarifying the authority of the Judicial Conference
to review decisions of its Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability
Orders," presumably in reference to the failure of the entire conference to review the
Committee's decision to dismiss the Real appeal on procedural grounds. Id. at 2o8. The
twelfth recommendation suggested that other circuits adopt a program pioneered by the
Ninth Circuit, which provided a telephone hotline for judges in crisis. See id.
225 See idat 208.
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in some cases, chief judges consider transferring misconduct complaints
out of the circuit in which they originated.116 The Committee stated:
"Transfers should not be a regular occurrence, but some complaints might
be better handled by judges outside the circuit. We can see reasons for
and against doing so." ' 7  Potentially transferable cases included high-
profile complaints "whose local disposition might create a threat to public
confidence in the process-the view that judges will go easy on colleagues
with whom they dine or socialize." ' 8 Also included in this list were well-
supported complaints that named all of the judges within a circuit, attacked
a circuit's internal procedures, or were "filed in a circuit beset by internal
tension tied to the alleged misconduct."
2 2 9
But the Committee found that an equal number of factors counseled
against out-of-circuit transfers: a lesser ability among judges unknown
to each other to determine the best way to dispose of a complaint or to
enforce a sanction; less inclination to "go through the emotionally draining
work of imposing tough sanctions on judges not of their own circuit";
and the delay and expense involved in handling disciplinary proceedings
"from a distance." 230 The equal number of pros and cons on both sides,
none weighted more than any of the others, suggested an endorsement of
transfers that was, at best, lukewarm.231
The Committee proposed no changes to the Act's strict confidentiality
provision. This was not surprising, for, as the Committee stated at the
outset of the report, its responsibility was not "to rewrite the Act, and none
of our recommendations requires statutory amendment."32 But while the
Committee was not charged with overhauling the language of the statute,
it was committed to answering its critics' loudly voiced concerns that
the judicial system of self-discipline was unable to function effectively
because judges were more concerned with protecting their colleagues than
policing them.233 The secrecy cloaking the Act's procedures had long been





231 Id at 214-15 (listing four factors favoring transfer and four factors disfavoring
transfer).
232 Id. at 120.
233 See idat 1 19 (stating that the Committee was formed in response to "recent criticism
from Congress" and noting that a self-regulatory disciplinary system "risks a kind of undue
'guild favoritism' through inappropriate sympathy with the judge's point of view or de-
emphasis of the misconduct problem"); Tony Mauro, Judicial Conference OKs New Rules on
Complaints, TIE RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 12, 2oo8, at 3 (reporting that the Breyer
Committee was established after Congress argued for more uniformity and transparency in
the disciplinary process and debated passing an Inspector General law).
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criticized as facilitating the whitewashing of valid complaints.134 Despite
the vital role of secrecy in the Act's administration, the Committee's report
did not suggest that it contributed to the frequency with which judges
dismissed legitimate complaints without conducting an inquiry or providing
an explanation.
B. The Conclusion of the Real Complaint
1. Congress.-Real's battle with Congress ended less than two months after
the Breyer Committee issued its report, when mid-term elections changed
the political climate dramatically in Washington. The elections, held in
November 2006, handed control of both the House and the Senate to the
Democrats. Now in the minority, the Republican's agenda-including the
push for greater control over the judiciary-had been shelved indefinitely.
235
Congress' impeachment inquiry went no further than the September
hearing, and Sensenbrenner's Inspector General bill met a similar fate.
Although it was approved by the House Judiciary Committee in late
September 2006, the legislation never came to the floor for a vote. 36
2. The Judicial Council and the Judicial Conference.-Real's investigation
by the judiciary, however, continued for another sixteen months. 37  On
234 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REv. 431, 465-69 (2004); John P. Sahl,
Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-Democratic Values and Judicial Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 193, 225-48 (1994).
235 See Bruce Moyer, A Warmer Climate for the Federal Courts in the New Congress, 54 FED.
LAW. 10 (2007) (reporting that after the zoo6 elections, "[Ilegislation to establish an inspector
general for the federal judiciary is not expected to move in a Democratic Congress, nor are
proposals to split the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals").
236 SeeWheeler & Katzmann, supra note 3o , at 117 1-72. In January 2007, Sensenbrenner
and Grassley once again tried to pass legislation to create an Inspector General for the federal
judiciary. See H.R. 785, iloth Cong. (2007); S. 461, ilorh Cong. (2007); see also Sen. Grassley,
Rep. Sensenbrenner See Need for Inspector General for Judiciary, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 31, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 19o6o8. Once again, their efforts failed.
237 A third misconduct complaint against Real, also filed by Yagman, was resolved on
December 12, zoo8. See Order and Memorandum In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct,
Nos. 07-89000 and 89oo (9th Cir. Jud. Council Dec. 12, zoo8), at 2-4 (mem.), available
at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders.html. The complaint accused Real of
abusing his authority by failing, on numerous occasions, to follow explicit directives from the
Ninth Circuit and provide the reasons for his decisions. See In re Memorandum of Decision
of Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, 517 F3d 558, 559 (U.S.
Jud. Conf. Jan. 18, zoo8). A special committee appointed to investigate these allegations held
a hearing in November zoo6, after which it found Real guilty of misconduct for "engaging in
a pattern and practice of not providing reasons [for his decisions] when required to do so." Id.
at 559-6o. The committee issued a private reprimand. See id. Real and Yagman appealed, the
former challenging the finding and the latter challenging the sanction. On January 14, 2oo8,
the judicial conference reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration. Id. at 56o-61.
The conference concluded that the council needed to find that Real acted "willfully" before
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November 16, 2006, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council found Real guilty
of misconduct. 3 Adopting the findings of the Special Committee, the
Council concluded that Real, in defending himself against the allegations
in the 2003 and 2005 complaints, made statements that were "inaccurate
and misleading in material and significant respects."' 39  The Judicial
Council determined that Real's wrongdoing-his judicial actions based
on an ex parte communication and his "not believable" statements about
those actions-warranted a public reprimand. 4 ° The reprimand consisted
of a letter, addressed to Real and available on-line, informing him that he
had been found guilty of misconduct.2 4'
Both Real and Yagman appealed to the Judicial Conference. 42 The
conference, which assigned the appeal to a five-judge committee, 43
it could find him guilty of misconduct. See id. at 561-62. It further stated that if Real had
acted willfully, a private reprimand was insufficient punishment, particularly in light of the
"totality of recent misconduct by this judge." Id. at 562. After reviewing an additional report
by the special committee, the judicial council dismissed the complaint, concluding that it
could not "find clear and convincing evidence of misconduct as defined by the Remand Order
because of its stringent requirements for findings as to the District Judge's state of mind." In
re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 07-89000 and 89020, at 2.
238 See Order and Memorandum In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, Nos. 07-89000
and 89020, at 1-2. The vote to find Real guilty of misconduct and to impose sanctions was
io-i. The lone dissenter, senior judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr., sat on the same district court as
Real. Id. at 3-5.
239 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21-26. For example, in 2003,
Real submitted a statement to the judicial council in which he wrote that he had taken
control over Canter's bankruptcy case because he believed a legitimate legal issue existed
as to her right of occupancy and that her lawyer had "abandoned her interest" by failing to
argue the issue on Canter's behalf. Id. at 21. But the record revealed the contrary: "Real had
no information that the ownership of the house was a disputed issue until after he withdrew
the bankruptcy reference and issued the stay order" and likewise, no evidence that Canter
suffered from deficient representation. Id. In another example, Real testified that he issued
the stay, and twice denied the trust's motions to lift it, out of concern that the Canter trust
had improperly filed her confidential pre-sentence report as an attachment to its state court
pleadings. See id. at 23-24. But the committee concluded no such concerns could have
existed at that point, because Real had been assured, in pleadings submitted more than one
year earlier, that the error had been corrected. See idat 24. The "true explanation," according
to the council, was that Real acted without legal authority and in response to a private plea
for help. Id.
240 Id. at 25,31-32.
241 See Letter of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski to Hon. Manuel Real (Jan. 17,2oo8), available
at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/real-reprimand-letter.pdf.
242 See In re Memorandum of Decisions of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Judicial Conduct and Disability, 517 F3d 563, 564 (U.S. Jud. Conference Jan. 14, 2oo8).
243 The five judges, all members of the judicial conference, were as follows: Ralph
K. Winter, Pasco M. Bowman II, Carolyn R. Dimmick, Dolores K. Sloviter, and Joseph A.
DiClerico, Jr. None of the five judges sat in the Ninth Circuit. Judge Dimmick recused
herself. See id. at 564.
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upheld the Judicial Council's order in its entirety.3"4 The unanimous
decision, issued on January 14, 2008, concluded that the misconduct
findings were supported by "overwhelming evidence."' 45 Although the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council had made no mention of other possible
sanctions-either more or less severe'4--the conference opinion found
that its decision to punish Real with a public reprimand "was arrived at
through a full consideration of the available alternatives, and should not be
overturned."2 47
C. The New Rules
In March 2008, the Judicial Conference announced that it had enacted
twenty-nine rules to improve the disciplinary process by providing clear
guidelines for judges to follow." s Unlike the Illustrative Rules, which
had been in place since 1986, the new Rules were binding on all of the
circuits. 49 An accompanying press release explained that the mandatory
Rules, which incorporated all twelve recommendations in the Breyer
Committee Report, were designed to bring "consistency and rigor" to the
Act's implementation.5 0 The press release also made clear, however, that
the reforms were limited by the constraints of the Act itself. The statute's
strict confidentiality requirements, for example, remained intact. 51 As
always, the public was forbidden from attending misconduct hearings,
reading special committee reports, or reviewing the evidence against an
accused judge.5 2
The Rules set new restrictions on chief judges, but left their most
significant powers undisturbed. Rule 5 required them to initiate a complaint
against a colleague upon "clear and convincing" evidence of misconduct
regardless of whether an outside party had made a formal charge. 53 But
under Rule 11, the chief judges retained their broad discretion to resolve
these and other misconduct complaints informally by concluding that the
244 See id. at 569.
245 Id.
246 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-32 (incorporated by
reference in the judicial council's order dated Nov. 16, zoo6).
247 In re Memorandum of Decisions of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial
Conduct and Disability, 517 E3d 563,569 (U.S. Jud. Conference Jan. 14, 2008).
248 See Press Release, National Rules Adopted for Judicial Conduct and Disability (Mar.




252 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 23(a)-
(c), (g)-(h) (2oo8).
253 Id. at R. 5.
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accused judge voluntarily had taken "appropriate corrective action."' 14 This
type of mea culpa "should include steps taken by that judge to acknowledge
and redress the harm, if possible, such as by apology, recusal from a case,
or a pledge to refrain from similar conduct in the future." ' While the
volunteered corrective action had to meet the chief judge's approval, the
complainant was provided no means of participating in the process, nor
was the complainant's consent a pre-condition for this informal-and
confidential--dismissal.
5 6
As justification for this method of resolving valid complaints without
public airing or complainant participation, the commentary to the rules
cited "the implicit understanding that voluntary self-correction or redress
of misconduct or disability is preferable to sanctions." ' 7 The Rules did not
cite to the Act as the basis for this "implicit understanding."5 8 And, while
the commentary also noted that the voluntarily undertaken corrective
action should "be proportionate to any sanctions that the judicial council
might impose," it did not explain how such a proportionality analysis might
be undertaken. Nor did the commentary acknowledge that conducting a
proportionality analysis might be difficult given that voluntary corrective
action, by definition, bypassed the investigatory process designed to
explore the full contours of the misconduct by obtaining and weighing the
evidence.5 9
The new Rules also took a step toward expanding the power of the
judicial conference, but stopped short of granting it the full authority of
254 Id. at R. I l(a)(2), (d)(1)-(2).
255 Id. at R. I1 cmt.
256 See id. at R. I I cmt. While the complainant has no right to any formal involvement,
the commentary provides that "[iun some cases, corrective action may not be 'appropriate'
to justify conclusion of the complaint unless the complainant or other individual harmed is
meaningfully apprised of the nature of the corrective action in the chief judge's order, in a
direct communication from the subject judge, or otherwise." Id. at 17. The confidentiality
rules that apply to dismissals of complaints as frivolous or falling outside the Act apply with
equal force to complaints dismissed upon a finding of corrective action: the dismissal order
"will be made public, usually without disclosing the names of the complainant or the subject
judge." Id. at 17-18.
257 Seeid. at R. II cmt.
258 The commentary to Rule I I cited to the Breyer Committee Report as support for
the proposition that the purpose of the Act was primarily correctional, not punitive. See id
(citing the Breyer Committee Report). This portion of the Committee's report, entitled,
Committee Standards for Assessing Compliance with the Act, essentially restated the
proposition-"[t]erminating a complaint based on corrective action is premised on the implicit
understanding that voluntary self-correction is preferable to sanctions imposed from without"
-but, like the Rules, cited no supporting statutory authority or case law. BREYER COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 244.




a traditional appellate court."6 Under Rule 21, the Judicial Conference
could review any dismissal by a chief judge or Judicial Council regardless
of whether a special committee had been appointed . 61 This put an end
to the possibility of future Judicial Conference decisions dismissing
uninvestigated complaints on jurisdictional grounds, as had occurred in
the Real case. 6  Now complainants like Yagman would have the right
to argue to a higher tribunal that the chief judge or Judicial Council had
erred by ignoring or overlooking disputed material facts. But the Judicial
Conference had only one alternative upon finding of this type of error-to
send the case back to the chief judge with instructions to appoint a special
committee . 63 The Judicial Conference could not mete out discipline on
its own or make any factual findings outside the limited determination that
further investigation was required.164
Only two of the twenty-nine Rules acknowledged the elephant in the
room: the widespread perception that institutional bias too often impeded
the Act's enforcement. 65 Rule 25, which dealt with disqualification, left
almost entirely to the individual judge's "discretion" whether recusal was
warranted in any given circumstance.2 66 Disqualification was mandatory
only as to the accused: the judge who was the subject of the misconduct
complaint was barred from judging it.2 67 The chiefjudge was not disqualified
from membership on the council reviewing a decision that she authored, 68
nor were judges with familial relationships to the accused prevented from
participating in the process of disciplining them.
269
Rule 26, which addressed the issue of transfers, allowed the chief judge
and the Judicial Council to request to transfer misconduct complaints out-
of-circuit.7 0 Transfer requests went to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, who had the unbridled authority to grant or deny them.' The
short commentary accompanying the Rule suggested that out-of-circuit
260 Seeid. at R. 21 & 22.
z61 See id. at R. 21(b)(2).
262 See id. atR. 21 cmt.
263 See id. at R. 21(b)(2).
264 See id; see also MacLean, Federal Bench Reforms Fall Short, NAT'L L.J., March 3,
zoo8, at I, (reporting that the judicial conference "cannot make independent findings of
misconduct");
265 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDIcIAL-DISABILITY Proceedings R. 25, 26
(2oo8).
z66 Id. at R. 25(a).
267 See id. at R. 25(b), (e), and (f).
268 See id. at R. 25(c).
269 See id. at R. 25 cmt. (providing that, where a judge is related to the accused judge, the
judge "may, in his or her discretion, conclude that disqualification [from participation in the
disciplinary process] is warranted").




transfers might be considered in cases where multiple Judicial Council
members had disqualified themselves, in high-profile cases where the
sensitivity or nature of the allegation might lead the public to question
the home circuit's impartiality, or where the complainant herself raised the
issue of home circuit bias. 72 But Rule 26 made it clear that transfers should
be a last-resort option, invoked only "[i]n exceptional circumstances.
2 7 3
V. THE JUDICIARY'S REFORMS ARE NECESSARY, BUT INSUFFICIENTTOADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL BIAs-BOTH As A MATTER OF PERCEPTION
AND A MATTER OF FACT
A. The Four-Factor Problem
The reforms undertaken by the judiciary fall short of correcting the most
serious problems plaguing the Act's enforcement: the perception and reality
that institutional bias infects the disciplinary process. As the Realcomplaint
demonstrated, where favoritism triumphs over fairness, the consequences
can resound far beyond the specifics of the case. The repercussions-the
outcry over the chief judge and Judicial Council's erroneous decisions to
dismiss the complaint; the Judicial Conference's order leaving these errors
unremedied; and the spectacle of the accused judge hauled before Congress
to defend himself in impeachment proceedings-call the integrity of the
process into question.
The Breyer Committee Report underscored these concerns when it
reached the broader and more unsettling conclusion that the Real case was
part of a systemic problem rather than an aberration. That is, in high-profile
cases, judges too frequently demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to
follow the Act, a signal that institutional bias was infecting the proceedings
and corrective measures were warranted. But the changes proposed by the
Breyer Committee and incorporated into the new Rules failed to provide
these corrective measures, because they left unaddressed the root causes of
the problem.
Four interrelated factors allow institutional bias to flourish: the secrecy
that shrouds the disciplinary process; the lopsided allocation of rights
between the complainant and the accused; the lack of mandatory sanctions
for willful and egregious misconduct; and the practice of having high-
profile cases handled by the home circuit, where the judges are more likely
to know, and sympathize with, the accused.
As to the first factor, it is true that the Act's strict confidentiality
provisions tie judges' hands to some degree. But the judiciary takes the
confidentiality provisions to an extreme that the Act never intended,
272 See id. at R. 26 cmt.
273 Seeid. at R. 26.
2oo8-2oo9]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
undermining confidence in the validity of the process. As to the remaining
factors, the judiciary has broad discretion to level the playing field between
the complainant and the accused, tighten its standards for recusal and
out-of-circuit transfers, and mete out strict discipline for clear misconduct.
Presented with the opportunity to address all of these issues in the wake of
the Real scandal, the Breyer Committee Report, and the threat of oversight
by an Inspector General, the judiciary addressed none.
Underlying the judiciary's reluctance to initiate these reforms appears
to be the oft-stated "implicit understanding" that the purpose of judicial
discipline is to rehabilitate the accused in private rather than call him to
account public account. 7 4 This "implicit understanding" finds its strongest
support in the Act's legislative history, which expresses a preference for
the "informal, collegial resolution of the great majority of meritorious
disability or disciplinary matters." ' The legislative history also states,
however, that "[t]he foremost and primary obligation of the whole judicial
disability and disciplinary system are the protection of the public and the
administration of justice." 7 6 In practice, the "informal collegial resolution"
of valid misconduct complaints is frequently at odds with this "foremost
and primary obligation." Too often, the former is achieved at the latter's
expense.
Thus, by continuing to promote a rehabilitative interpretation of the
statue and, relatedly, by failing to address the problem of institutional bias,
the judiciary has allowed a level of dysfunction in the Act's enforcement
to persist. The final disposition of the Real complaint and the judiciary's
mishandling of two subsequent misconduct complaints, discussed infra,
provide additional support for this conclusion. Change must come both
from within and without. Judges cannot shy away from passing public and
unsparing judgment on their colleagues-no matter how disagreeable and
uncomfortable that task may be. Congress also must provide much-needed
guidance in this process by amending the statute's provisions to ensure
that the Act functions as intended: "to assure the public that valid citizen
complaints are being considered in a forthright and just manner." '77
B. Illustrations of the Four-Factor Problem:
The Real, Kent, and Mahan Cases
1. The Real Complaint.-The Real case exemplifies the four-factor problem
-secrecy, unfair allocation of rights, intra-circuit bias, and lack of mandatory
sanctions. Secrecy was, perhaps, the least lasting legacy of the case because
the Judicial Council's decision to adopt and publish the Special Committee's
274 See id. at R. ii cmt.; see also BREYER COMMiTrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 244.
275 S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4317 (198o).
276 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4327.
277 Id. at 4321.
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report meant that the public could review the reasoning underlying the
disciplinary decision. Still, the hearings were closed, the evidence remains
sealed, and the disclosure of the Special Committee's report came too
late-more than thirteen months after the Special Committee had issued
its detailed findings of misconduct. Real, the presumptive beneficiary of
the delay, was not helped by it; the press had outed him years earlier. If
anything, the belated disclosure cast doubt on the validity of the judicial
disciplinary process "by putting off the day when the public would see"
how the Special Committee had dealt with the allegations."' 8
The lopsided allocation of procedural rights was also problematic. While
the complainant had no personal stake in the case, 79 he stood in the shoes
of the Canter trust, which had lost tens of thousands of dollars as a result
of Real's misconduct. 80 As the aggrieved party, the Canter trust should
have had a say in the fashioning of the sanction, but the trust's members
had no voice in the process."8 " The Ninth Circuit's failure to transfer the
case-an option even before the enactment of the new Rules 28 -was
equally problematic. From the outset, the Ninth Circuit's handling of the
case appeared biased: repeatedly, Real's circuit and district court colleagues
showed an unwillingness to squarely confront the allegations against him
and discipline him accordingly. By the time the decision was made to
reopen the case in 2006, the Ninth Circuit's failure to follow the Act had
been widely documented and roundly criticized. The chief judge or one
of the Council members should have acknowledged the obvious-that the
Ninth Circuit's loss of credibility meant there could be no public confidence
in its judgment-and sought to have the case handled by judges from an
outside circuit.
But of all the errors in the handling of the Real complaint, the most
problematic was the judiciary's failure to impose a sufficiently severe
sanction. In the Council's judgment, which the Judicial Conference
affirmed, Real's misconduct merited only the short-lived embarrassment
of a public reprimand, leaving all of his judicial powers intact. Rather than
call Real's misconduct what it was-unethical and dishonest-the Ninth
Circuit went out of its way to minimize and excuse it. None of Real's
transgressions, in the Council's view, rose to the level of an impeachable
offense because Real lacked any malicious intent.2 3 His motivation in
taking over Canter's bankruptcy case was kindhearted, not venal, and his
278 See Hellman, supra note 2oI, at 233-34.
279 See id. at 189.
280 See id.; In re Canter v. Canter, 299 E3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Complaint of
Judicial Misconduct, 425 E3d 1179, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (estimating
loss to Canter trust at "$50,000 or more").
28I See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-8, 10, 24-29.
282 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 209.
283 See REAL SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
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false statements to his colleagues were "motivated more by anger and self-
deception than by a deliberate attempt to deceive others.'z
4
The Council provided no explanation for its failure to consider more
severe sanctions, such as recommending that Real retire from the bench or
forcing him to take a leave of absence. Real was not even asked to apologize
to the victims of his misconduct. The Council did not even require Real
to complete an ethics course or bar him from meeting privately with his
probationers to prevent a Canter-type situation from reoccurring. At the
conclusion of the misconduct case, more than three years after the filing
of the initial complaint, Real's daily life on the bench was unchanged: he
continued to reside over a mixed docket of criminal and civil cases with no
restriction on his judicial duties whatsoever.
The Council's reasoning does not stand up to scrutiny. Even assuming
that the Council accurately characterized as benevolent Real's decision
to come to Canter's aid, his motivations were irrelevant to the nature and
severity of the harm. When he enriched Canter at her ex-in-laws' expense
based on a private communication, Real violated one of the most basic
tenets of judicial ethics: to perform the duties of his office impartially. His
actions were willful, protracted, and harmful, not just to the Canter Trust,
but to the integrity of the judiciary as a whole. Reprimanding Real without
any additional sanction minimized the severity of misconduct, and signaled
to the public that judges are kinder to themselves than anyone else. This
type of double-standard evinces the institutional bias that the judiciary
needs to eradicate if it hopes to convince critics that it can police itself.
Moreover, the evidence in the record lends little support to the judiciary's
interpretation of Real's actions as self-deceptive. Placed in context, Real's
"inaccurate and misleading statements" ' Z5 signal a calculated attempt to
deceive others. They contradicted Real's original explanation conceding
the ex parte communication and were offered only after it became clear
that the council was taking the misconduct allegations seriously. At that
point, Real's overriding interest lay in deceiving his colleagues to avoid
punishment.
Moreover, Real's false statements were arguably criminal, and the Judicial
Council was remiss for not recognizing this fact and taking appropriate
action. Under federal law, it is a felony to "[make] any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" in connection with
any matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch.,,8 A separate
federal statute criminalizes perjury."8 7 At the conclusion of the Council's
investigation, there was at least some evidence that Real had committed
both of these crimes. The judiciary should have forwarded the evidence of
284 Id.
285 See id. at 20.
z86 18 U.S.C. § IOOI(a) (2008).
287 Seeid. § I621.
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its investigation to the Department of Justice with a recommendation that
it conduct a thorough inquiry to determine whether criminal charges were
warranted.
Consistent with its obligations under the Act, the Council was also
obligated to inform the Judicial Conference that Real's misconduct "might
constitute one or more grounds for impeachment." '288 The statute's use of
the word "might" indicates that the council's finding needed to be based
only on the possibility-not the probability or indisputability-that Real's
misdeeds were impeachment-worthy.28 9 Given the context in which Real
made his false statements and the length of time he had to deliberate
before making them, there was at least a possibility that his behavior might
meet the "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" standard for impeachment.219
The Council should have recognized as much and provided the full record
of its investigation to the Judicial Conference, which, if it concurred, would
be required to forward the case to Congress "for whatever action the House
of Representatives considers to be necessary.'2 9
2. The Kent Complaint.-On May 21, 2007, a misconduct complaint was
filed against Samuel B. Kent, a federal district court judge in Galveston,
Texas, within the Fifth Circuit. 92 Four months later, Chief Judge Edith
Jones issued an order publicly reprimanding Kent.2 93 The September 28,
2007 order, which barely exceeded two doubled-spaced pages, described
the complaint as "alleging sexual harassment" and the complainant as "an
employee of the federal judicial system."294 The order provided no further
details about the allegations or the accuser, whose name, job description,
and gender were not identified.9"
The information provided about the Council's decision to reprimand
Kent was similarly sparse. The order stated that a Special Committee
had been appointed to explore the charges, and at some later point, its
288 28 U.S.C. § 354(b)(2)(A) (2oo8).
289 See id; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
290 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
291 28 U.S.C. § 355(b)(i) (2008).
292 See In Re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against U.S. District Judge Samuel B.
Kent under Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of I98o, No. 07-05-351-0036 (5th Cir. Jud.
Council Sept. 28, 2007), at 2 [hereinafter First Kent Order].
293 See id. at 2-3. According to the Houston Chronicle, the order was preceded by two
terse directives. See Lise Olsen & Harvey Rice, Judge Samuel Kent Has Been Reprimanded for
"Inappropriate Behavior" Over Sexual Harassment Charges. But That Only Begins To Tell The Story.
The Case of the Judge Who Went Too Far, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 1I, 2007, at Ai. The first directive,
issued on May 25, 2007, reassigned just under one-third of Kent's docket to other judges; the
second, issued on August 27, directed Kent to step down from the bench for four months at
full salary. See id. No reason was provided for these orders. See id.
294 See First Kent Order, supra note 292, at 2.
295 See id. at i-3.
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investigation broadened to include "alleged inappropriate behavior toward
other employees of the federal judicial system."296 No further information
was provided about the "other employees," or why the Committee
had decided to bring their allegations within the scope of the original
complaint.197 The Council stated only that the Special Committee had
issued a report addressing all of the allegations, which the Judicial Council
adopted "by a majority vote." 9 No mention was made of the numerical
split among the judges, the basis for their disagreement, or the substance
of the conclusions reached by the majority."'
The order stated cryptically that Kent was reprimanded "for the conduct
that the report describes."3°° It did not explain what that conduct entailed
other than to say that it "violated the mandates of the Canons of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges and [was] deemed prejudicial
to the effective administration ... of justice."3 ' As punishment for this
unspecified misconduct, Kent was required to take a four-month leave
of absence from the bench, and agree to a "reallocation of the Galveston/
Houston docket and other measures."302  No description of the "other
measures" was provided other than to characterize them, in combination
with the other sanctions, as "appropriate remedial action" that justified
closing the case.30 3 Citing the confidentiality provision of the Act, the order
stated that the Committee's report would be kept under seal, as would the
written response-presumably filed by Kent or his lawyers-although that
was not made clear.
30 4
In keeping with the Act's requirement that courts publish their final
dispositions, the Fifth Circuit posted the order on its website.30 1 But
the very terseness of the document-the only one made available to the
public-raised more questions than it answered. What had Kent done and
to whom? Where had the misconduct occurred? What evidence did the
Council rely upon to find him guilty? How had it reached the conclusion that
296 Id. at 1-2.
297 Id. at 1-3.
298 Id. at 2.
299 See id. at 1-3.




304 See id. at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2008), which provides that, with certain limited
exceptions, "all papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to investigations
conducted under this chapter shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person
in any proceedings").
305 28 U.S.C. §§ 36o(b).
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the sanctions it imposed-not all of which were enumerated-constituted
"appropriate remedial action" ?06
The unanswered questions, along with the incendiary nature of the
allegations, quickly attracted the interest of the press.0 7 The Kent case
received extensive coverage by the Houston Chronicle and the Texas Lawyer,
which made it their business to air fully the allegations that the Council had
left obscure.3 8 The day after the order was issued, The Chronicle identified
the complainant as Cathy McBroom, a forty-nine-year-old woman who
worked for Kent as his case manager.309 Kent and McBroom, both of whom
had retained counsel, steadfastly refused to comment,310 but sources close
to McBroom spoke out. They described Kent's actions as going far beyond
the "sexual harassment" described in the court's order.3" According to
McBroom's mother and close friend, Kent forced up McBroom's shirt and
bra, fondled her bare breast, and attempted to push her head toward his
crotch, all the while "telling the married mother of three what he wanted
to do to her in words too graphic to publish.1
31
1
The press also dug out the facts underlying what the Judicial Council
termed "alleged inappropriate behavior toward other employees of the
federal judicial system. '13 3 One article reported that Kent had a pattern
of sexually harassing female subordinates that dated back to 2000.
3 1
1
McBroom's predecessor stated that when she worked as Kent's case
manager, the judge subjected her to crude comments, sexual come-ons,
and embraces.315 Years earlier, McBroom, on behalf of herself and other
306 First Kent Order, supra note 292, at 2.
307 See, e.g., Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John Council, 5th Circuit JudicialCouncilReprimands
Judge Samuel B. Kent: Statistics Show Rarity of Staff Complaints Against Federal Judges, 23 Tx.
LAw. 5 (Oct. 8, 2007); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John Council, DOJ Subpoenas Judicial Council
Seeking Kent-Related Documents, 23 Thx. LAw. 5 (Dec. 3, 2007); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John
Council, Houston Heavyweights, 25 Tex. Law 41 (Dec. 17, 2007); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John
Council, Judicial Council Reprimands Texas District Judge: Judge Samuel Kent Faced a Complaint of
Sexual Harassment, i 18 TEx. LAw. 5 (Oct. Ii, 2007); Lise Olsen, Harvey Rice, & Cindy George,
Federal Judge Discip lined After Harassment Probe: Kent, Who's Been On Leave, Is Accused of Touching
a Worker in his Chambers, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2007, at A i; Olsen & Rice, supra note 293, at
Ai; Olsen, supra note 2, at Ai.
308 See supra note 307, and accompanying text.
309 See Olsen, et al., supra note 307, at Ai.
310 See id.
311 See id.
312 Olsen & Rice, supra note 293, at Ai.
313 First Kent Order, supra note 292, at 1-2.
314 Olsen & Rice, supra note 293, at Ai. In a subsequent article, the Houston Chronicle
revealed the sources as Mary Ann Schopp, McBroom's mother; Felicia Williams, McBroom's
predecessor as Kent's former case manager; and, Charlene Clark, McBroom's childhood friend.
Id. According to the article, dated November I1, 2007, all three women spoke with McBroom




female co-workers, unsuccessfully tried to get help in addressing Kent's
inappropriate behavior, complaining to a supervisor that the judge tried "to
touch or kiss" them.
316
The contrast between the Fifth Circuit's terse order and the media's
detailed account of Kent's sexual misconduct was stark. Experts in judicial
misconduct law criticized the Council's order as devoid of meaningful
information.317 McBroom's lawyer, Rusty Hardin, went further, stating that
the Council's description of Kent's misdeeds as "sexual harassment" was
"totally inappropriate," because Kent's actions were far more serious and
potentially criminal. 318 Hardin also criticized the quality of the Council's
investigation and its treatment of his client, stating that the judges had
refused McBroom's requests for a copy of the Special Committee's report
or any other information about the investigation.
319
The steady emergence of salacious new details kept the Kent case in
the headlines for weeks after the judicial council declared the complaint
officially closed.32 0  Ultimately, Congress weighed in. In a bi-partisan
statement released on November 13, 2007, the three highest ranking
members of the House Judiciary Committee called McBroom's allegations
"shocking" and "ofgrave concern. '32 ' Strongly indicating their disagreement
with the Fifth Circuit's handling of the complaint, the committee members
encouraged McBroom to appeal to the Judicial Conference. 322 Noting that
criminal charges against Kent were a possibility, the committee members
indicated they would take a wait-and-see stance, but promised that if the
316 Seeid.
317 See Olsen & Rice, supra note 293, at Ai (interviewing Northwestern Law School
Professor Steven Lubet and quoting James Alfini, President of South Texas College Law,
co-authors of a textbook on judicial ethics).
318 Jeffreys & Council, DOJ Subpoenas Judicial Council Seeking Kent-Related Documents,
supra note 307, at 5.
319 See id; see also Jeffreys & Council, Houston Heavyweights, supra note 307, at 5; Jeffreys
& Council, 5th Circuit Repimands Judge SamuelB. Kent, supra note 307, at 5.
320 First Kent Order, supra note 292, at 1-2 (stating that the Judicial Council "concluded
the proceedings [against Kent] because appropriate remedial action had been and will be
taken"); Olsen & Rice, supra note 293, at Ai; Olsen, supra note 2; Jeffreys & Council, DOJ
Subpoenas Judicial Council Seeking Kent-Related Documents, supra note 307, at 5.
321 Olsen, supra note 2. The statement was signed by Rep. John Conyers, Jr., a Democrat
and the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee; Rep. Lamar Smith, the ranking
Republican member of the committee; and Rep. Howard Berman, a Democrat and chairman
of the subcommittee on federal courts. See id. Rep. Sheila Jackson, a Democrat, also pledged
to work with Conyers, Smith, and Berman to "closely monitor the review of the allegations
[against Kent] to determine if any further committee action is necessary." Id. (quoting a
spokeswoman for the committee); see also Jeffreys & Council, DOJ Subpoenas Judicial Council
Seeking Kent-Related Documents, supra note 307, at 5 (reporting that the statement was issued
on Nov. 13, 2007).
322 See Olsen, supra note 2.
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allegations were proven true, "there is no doubt that the committee will
take action."3 3
On November 26, 2007, McBroom filed a motion asking the Council
to reconsider the sanctions detailed in its previous order." 4  In early
December, the press reported that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had
issued a subpoena to the Judicial Council, demanding the sealed testimonial
and documentary evidence relating to the misconduct proceedings against
Kent. On December 20, 2007, the Judicial Council made its first public
statement since the reprimand issued against Kent nearly four months
earlier.3"5 In a three-page order, the Council confirmed that the DOJ had
launched a criminal investigation into the allegations against Kent and
that the Council was "cooperating" with the prosecutors.32 6 The order
announced the Council's decision to defer ruling on McBroom's motion
for reconsideration because further disciplinary proceedings "while a
criminal investigation is underway, could prejudice that investigation or
be perceived as interfering with it."' 327 The order concluded by stating
that if the criminal investigation was not resolved within ninety days, "the
Council will revisit the issue.
328
On August 28,2008, the United StatesAttorney's Office obtained a three-
count indictment against Kent, charging him with abusive sexual contact
and attempted aggravated sexual abuse of McBroom. 329 At his arraignment
several days later, Kent proclaimed his innocence vociferously and stated
his intent "to bring a horde of witnesses" to testify in his defense.330 On
January 6, 2009, the prosecution filed a superseding indictment adding
three charges involving a different woman, identified in the indictment
and the press as "Person B.' '331 According to the new allegations, Kent
323 Id.
324 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against District Court Judge Samuel B. Kent
under Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of i98o, No. 07-05-35 1-OO86) (5th Cir. Jud. Council
Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Third Kent Order].
325 See Second Kent Order, supra note 9, at 1-3.
326 Id. at 2.
327 Id. at 2-3.
328 Id. at 3.
329 See Olsen et al., supra note 9, at Ai.
330 Mary Flood, Kent Forcefully Pleads not Guilty to Sex Abuse Counts in Federal Court:
U.S. Judge Says He'll Take Stand, Provide Witnesses, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 3, zoo8, at Ai. Media
coverage of the arraignment noted that Kent was treated with an unusual level of courtesy
and respect by court personnel: "U.S. marshals in the courtroom were calling him 'Your honor,'
one asked how he was feeling, the officer overseeing his release was deferential while they
worked out the details and the general tone was far less formal and more convivial than these
hearings usually are." Id.
331 See United States v. Samuel B. Kent, CR No. o8-596-RV (Superseding Indictment
filed Jan. 6,2009); Lise Olsen & Mary Flood, Judge Facing New Sex Charges: Kent Is Also Accused
of Lyingto Appeals Court's Judicial Panel, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2009, at Ai.
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committed the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact
this unidentified individual by "engage[ing] in repeated unwanted sexual
assaults" against her.332 The final count of the indictment charged that Kent
had lied to the Fifth Circuit special committee during its investigation of
McBroom's allegations by falsely stating that the "extent of his unwanted
sexual contact with Person B was one kiss."3  On February 23, 2009, the
day his trial was scheduled to begin, Kent pleaded guilty to one count of
obstructing justice. As part of his plea agreement, Kent admitted that he
engaged in repeated "non-consensual sexual contact" with McBroom and
Person B and lied to cover it up.334
Three days after the new indictment was filed, the Fifth Circuit Judicial
Council issued an order stating that it was granting McBroom's motion for
reconsideration. 331 Stating that the new allegations exposed "additional
serious misconduct of which the Special Investigating Committee and
the Council were unaware," the council promised to investigate further at
the conclusion of Kent's criminal trial and, if warranted, "impose further
sanctions." 336
In January 2008, Judge Kent resumed his judicial duties on the bench,
to a limited degree. 337 By agreement, he does not preside over civil or
criminal matters where the federal government is involved in the litigation,
or over cases in which "sexual misconduct of any kind is alleged.
33
1
The near-total secrecy that blanketed the Judicial Council's handling of
the Kent complaint called into question the legitimacy of the process and the
outcome. The only documents available for public viewing are the Council's
three orders-the two issued in 2007 and the final order issued in January
2009. Less than eight pages combined, they are a study in obliqueness,
offering no insight into what Kent did, to whom he did it, what his exact
punishment was, and how the Council arrived at these determinations.
Nor did the Council's claim that it was "unaware" of the allegations
against Person B appear plausible given that Kent testified about them
before the Special Committee in 2007 after it expanded its investigation to
332 See Kent, CR No. o8-596-RV.
333 Id.
334 United States v. Samuel B. Kent, No 4:o8CRo596-RV (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009) (Plea
Agreement); Mary Flood and Lise Olsen, Kent Plea Avoids Trial, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2009,
Ai,A5.
335 See Third Kent Order, supra note 324, at 1-2.
336 Id. at 2.
337 See Pamela A. MacLean, Judging Federal Judges, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 2oo8, at i
("In Galveston, Texas, U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent returned to work on Jan. 3 after
a month-month suspension, with pay, following a 5th Circuit Judicial Council finding of
'sexual harassment' of a female employee. Kent was transferred to Houston, but so was his
accuser."); Second Kent Order, supra note 9. at 1-3 (enumerating the limitations on Kent's
judicial duties).
338 Second Kent Order, supra note 9, at 1-3.
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include accusations brought by individuals other than McBroom. "I The
Council's lack of transparency called into question both the legitimacy of
its initial investigation and the proffered reasons for its belated grant of
McBroom's reconsideration motion. The lack of transparency also appears
to violate the Act, which requires that judicial orders imposing sanctions
"be accompanied by written reasons therefore." 34 The Council's orders
provided no public "written reasons"; its factual findings and analysis were
contained in a report that no one but Kent and his lawyer was allowed to
read."4 Nor did the information blackout serve any useful purpose. To
the contrary, the blackout had profoundly negative consequences for Kent,
his accuser, and most of all, for the judiciary. The press moved quickly
into the vacuum, supplying the missing content by talking to the parties'
surrogates who were not bound by the Act's confidentiality rules. Perhaps
this was inevitable, for the words "sexual harassment," when publicly
linked to a federal judge, would likely incite a great deal of interest. It is at
least arguable, however, that some of McBroom's sources would have been
more circumspect had they felt that the Council was treating her fairly, thus
diminishing the likelihood that Kent's attorney would have felt the need to
respond in kind. But the perception of the sources was the opposite: they
appeared to feel that the Council had understated the seriousness of Kent's
misdeeds and treated McBroom like a second-class citizen.Z
The Judicial Council's terse description of Kent's misconduct and the
cold shoulder it offered McBroom gave credence to the perceptions of the
sources. Under the Act, McBroom was allowed to receive copies of the
Special Committee's report and Kent's response, but in a questionable
exercise of its discretion, the Council refused her repeated requests for
both documents. The Council's decision to keep McBroom in the dark,
while providing Kent with access to the very information it denied her, was
unnecessary as a matter of law and unwise as a matter of policy. The judges
appeared to be playing favorites-siding with a privileged colleague against
his far less powerful accuser. This unequal treatment enhanced McBroom's
victim status and fueled suspicions that her more serious accusations had
fallen on deaf ears.
Moreover, the cold shoulder the Council offered McBroom lent
credence to the perception of the sources who spoke to the press. The
339 See First Kent Order, supra note 292, at i-3; Third Kent Order, supra note 324, at
1-2.
340 28 U.S.C. § 36o(b) (2oo8).
341 See First Kent Order, supra note 292, at i-3; Second Kent Order, supra note 9, at
1-3.
342 See, e.g., Rick Casey, Judging the Judges Who Judged Kent, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2oo8,
at Ai (characterizing as "absurd" the Judicial Council's handing of McBroom's misconduct
complaint and calling on Congress to "investigate how the Judicial Council handled the




rich detail served up by the newspapers contrasted unfavorably with the
opaque legalese provided by the Council, and the disparity suggested
that the Council was purposefully withholding valuable information, thus
calling into question the validity of the entire process. Not surprisingly,
Congress responded by taking McBroom's side, encouraging her to appeal
and making conspicuous mention of possible criminal charges. The drama
roiled on, gathering more momentum with reports that prosecutors had
issued subpoenas to the judiciary for the heretofore confidential evidence
collected against Kent.
When the Council finally granted McBroom's motion for
reconsideration-more than one year after she filed it and only after two
separate indictments were sought against Kent-its actions seemed too
little, too late. The belated acknowledgement of the seriousness of the
allegations only added to the overall impression that the Council's initial
characterization of them was seriously understated and its sanctions
inadequate. The near-total lack of information or legal reasoning in
all three orders underscored this impression. In short, the Council's
unnecessary concealment of basic information from the public and from
McBroom and its ill-explained decision to wait more than one year to
reconsider its much-criticized approach to the misconduct complaint made
its disciplinary process appear illegitimate and ultimately, irrelevant. The
Council had lost the opportunity to air the allegations it found true and
make its case for the sufficiency of the sanctions it imposed. The belated
acknowledgment that a criminal inquiry was underway, followed by Kent's
indictment and ultimate guilty plea, only added to the overall impression
that the Council's punishment did not fit the severity of the misconduct,
and that the Council's lack of transparency was a means of preventing the
public from assessing the affect of institutional bias on its judgment. In
short, the Council's unnecessary concealment of basic information from the
public and from McBroom made its disciplinary process appear illegitimate,
and ultimately, irrelevant.
3. TheMahan Complaint.-In June 2006, the LosAngeles Times published three
lengthy articles detailing a two-year investigation into judicial corruption
in Las Vegas.343 The series, titled Juicev. Justice, focused particular attention
on James Mahan, 344 who was appointed to the federal district court in 2002
343 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai; Michael J. Goodman & William C.
Rempel, Juice v. Justice: A Times Investigation; Special Treatment Keeps Them Under the Radar, L.A.
TIMES, June o, zoo6, atAi ;Thevenot,supra note 8, at Bi (reporting that the investigation lasted
two years); Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice v. Justice: A Times Investigation; In
Las Vegas, They're Playing With a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TiMES, June 8, 2oo6, at Al.
344 The June 8, 2oo6 Times article devoted two paragraphs to Judge Mahan. See Goodman
& Rempel, In Las Vegas, They're Playing With a Stacked Deck, supra note 344, at Ai. The June
9, 2oo6 Times article, which totaled over 7446 words, focused exclusively on Judge Mahan.
See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4. The June 10, 2oo6 article did not mention Mahan.
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after serving for three years as a state court judge in Nevada."S The Times'
investigation reported that during his tenure as a state and federal judge,
Mahan awarded nearly five million dollars in judgments and fees to close
friends and political allies without disclosing his ties to those individuals. 346
The beneficiaries included Frank A. Ellis III, Mahan's former partner from
his days in private practice, and George Swarts, a longtime friend who
served as Mahan's campaign treasurer during two state judicial campaigns
and whose political connections were instrumental to Mahan's appointment
to the federal bench.
347
More than a dozen times, Mahan appointed Swarts to serve as a special
master or a receiver in business disputes; in the former capacity Swarts' job
was to sort out liability; in the latter, it was to take over the company until
the case concluded.ms In the majority of those cases, Swarts brought in
Ellis as his counsel, with Mahan's approval.m 9 Swarts and Ellis earned an
average of $250 per hour; their combined services cost the parties to these
disputes more than $700,000.350 Nothing in the court records indicated
that Mahan told the parties about his ties to Swarts or Ellis in any of these
cases.35' Mahan, who agreed to be interviewed for the series, told the
reporters that he felt no need to do so because "I don't see any conflict of
interest.
352
Three of the cases in which Mahan allegedly made judicial decisions
to benefit of colleagues and friends occurred during his tenure on the
federal bench. 353  In February 2002, Mahan appointed Swarts to serve
as a special master in a lawsuit filed by shareholders alleging corporate
mismanagement. 3 4 Mahan ordered the shareholders to pay Swarts $250
See Goodman & Rempel, Special Treatment Keeps Them Under the Radar, supra note 344, at Ai.
Interviewed by the Las Vegas Journal Review, Judge Mahan stated that the Los Angeles Times
reporters who authored the three-part series "wanted to attack the Las Vegas judiciary, and I
was the poster boy." Thevenot, supra note 8, at B 1; see also Tony Cook, Jaded Justice, LAS VEGAS
SUN, June 17, 2006, at Ai (reporting that "The Times dedicated an entire story in the series to
James Mahan").








353 See Desert Land v. Owens Financial Group, Inc., No. oo-0 14o6-JCM-PAL, rev'd, 154
F. App'x 586 (9th Cir. 2005); Gamble Trust v. E-Rex, Inc., No. 02-oo 145-JCM-LRL, rev'd, 84
E App'x 975 (9th Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Interstate Mortgage et. al., No. CV-5-oo-oo88 5-JCM-
PAL (D. Nev. May i6, 2003), available at 2003 WL 25778950.
354 See Gamble Trust v. E-Rex, Inc., 84 E App'x 975, 975 (9th Cir. 2004).
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per hour for his services and a $5000 advance. 3 5 With Mahan's approval,
Swarts hired Ellis as his attorney at a rate of $210 per hour.356 In August
2002, Mahan dismissed the case357 and ordered the shareholders to pay
$1582 to Ellis and $17,267 to Swarts for services rendered.358 The judge
never, informed the parties of his personal and professional connections
to either man.35 9 Also left undisclosed was the fact that, at the time Ellis
served as counsel, he was representing one of Mahan's employees pro bono
in a bankruptcy case.
3 °
In the second case, two investors sued the president of a mortgage
company and the company itself, claiming that they had been defrauded
of more than $100,000.361 At the time that the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit,
Swarts had been the mortgage company's receiver for more than two
years, which made him a defendant and a potential defense witness in the
lawsuit.3 6 Ellis was also involved in the litigation as counsel for Swarts and
the mortgage company.363 In October 2002, Mahan dismissed the charges
against the mortgage company.364 The plaintiffs, who eventually received
$82,000 from the company's president-the sole remaining defendant-
365
were never told of Mahan's ties to Swarts and Ellis.366
That same year, Mahan presided over a trial involving a businessman
named Howard Bulloch, who sued his mortgage broker for improperly
charging him a $3.8 million fee. 367 Bulloch and Mahan had worked closely
together on a legal matter in 1997, when Mahan was still in private practice.
3 68
Mahan ruled in Bulloch's favor and ordered the mortgage broker to pay
Bulloch $4.12 million-the full amount of the fee plus the interest.3 69 The
355 See Gamble Trust v. E-Rex, Inc., No. oz-oo145-JCM-LRL (D.Nev. Mar. 7, 2002)
(Minutes of the Court); see also Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
356 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
357 See Gamble, No. o2-0o1 4 5 -JCM-LRL (D.Nev. Aug. 2, 2002) (Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss).
358 See id. (Order Granting Application for Approval of Fees entered Aug. 16, 2002).
359 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Al; see also Gamble, No. 02-00145-JCM-
LRL,passim.
360 See Gamble, No. 02-0014 5 -JCM-LRL, passim.
361 Rogers v. Interstate Mortgage Group et. al., No. CV- 5-oo-oo88 5 -JCM-PAL (D.Nev.
May 16, 2oo3), available at 2003 WL 2577895 o.
362 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
363 See id.
364 Rogers, No. oo-oo885-JCM-PAL (D.Nev. Oct. II, 2002) (Order Granting Motion to
Dismiss Against Interstate Mortgage Group, Inc.).
365 See id. (Judgment entered May 9, 2003).
366 See id. passim; see also Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
367 See Desert Land, Inc. v. Owens Financial Group, Inc., No. oo-o1406-JCM-PAL (D.
Nev. Nov. 15, 2005).
368 Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
369 See Desert Land, No. oo-o 14o6-JCM-PAL.
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court records showed no disclosure by Mahan of his relationship to Bulloch
and the defendant's counsel confirmed that none was made.370 Less than
two months later, a state regulatory agency found that the broker's fees
were legal.37'
It is misconduct for a federal judge to use his judicial power "to obtain
special treatment for friends.""37 It is also unethical: Canon 3 of the Code
of Conduct for United States Judges states that "[a] judge should not make
unnecessary appointments and should exercise that power only on the basis
of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism."37 3 Special masters and receivers
are included among those judicial appointments. 37 4 A different provision
of the same Canon provides that a judge should disqualify himself from a
case where his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned.""37 Mahan's
appointment of Swarts, and his decisions to generously compensate Swarts
and Ellis, arguably violated both the Act and the Canons.
At least one federal judge thought so. This judge, who, like Mahan
presided over a trial court within the Ninth Circuit, asked the Judicial
Council to initiate disciplinary proceedings. 37 6 Subsequently, a misconduct
complaint against Mahan was "identified" by the chief judge, which
allowed the disciplinary process to commence without a formal filing.377
She appointed a special committee to look into Mahan's alleged
misconduct, limiting the investigation to Mahan's actions while on the
federal bench.
378
In August 2007-more than one year after the allegations surfaced-
the Judicial Council issued a two-page order dismissing the complaint. 379
The order stated that the dismissal was based upon the unanimous
recommendation of the Special Committee, which, after reviewing
voluminous evidence that included sixteen affidavits and more than two
dozen witness interviews, unanimously concluded that no misconduct
had occurred.3" The interviews, the affidavits, and the report itself were
sealed. The order contained no factual findings, only the conclusion that
370 See id. passim; see also Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at Ai.
371 Goodman & Rempel, supra note 4, at AI.
372 RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT, supra note 52, R. 3(h)(1)(A).
373 MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(4) (2008).
374 See id. at 3(B)(4).
375 Id. at 3(C)(I).
376 See Don Woutat, Inquiry Sought Into Vegas Jurist, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at A5.
377 See Memorandum and Order In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 06-89087,
at I (9th Cir. Jud. Council Aug. 23, 2007) (mem.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 351 and the Rules of
the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or
Disability).





the misconduct allegations were unsupported because the ties between
Mahan, Swarts, Ellis, and Bulloch "were not of the nature of extent
alleged," and therefore, "did not reasonably call into question the district
judge's impartiality or ability to preside fairly over the federal cases at
issue."38' Because the Council found no wrongdoing, the order did not
refer to Mahan by name.38
As with the Kent case, the secrecy that shrouded the disciplinary
proceedings was the salient factor-so dominant as to make the impact
of the others difficult to assess. The Judicial Council sealed the crucial
evidence supporting its findings. Without access to the witness interviews,
sworn statements, and thirty-three page report prepared by the Special
Committee, it is impossible to evaluate the Council's decision to dismiss
the complaint. Would an out-of-circuit transfer have been appropriate?
Was the finding of no misconduct proper, or did the Council err in failing to
sanction Mahan? The only publicly available document in the case is the
dismissal order, and it does not fill the evidentiary void. It provides no facts
to support the Council's determination that Mahan's ties to Swarts, Ellis,
and Bulloch "were not to the nature or the extent alleged," and that those
ties-whatever their nature or extent-had no affect on his impartiality in
the three cases where he ruled in their favor.
As in the Kent case, there was a profound disconnect between the
detailed allegations in the media and the judiciary's unilluminating
response. The misconduct allegations detailed in the newspaper reports
were supported by enough evidence to warrant serious consideration. But
the scanty information in the Council's order gave no assurance that the
most troubling facts in the newspaper's coverage were addressed with the
thoroughness necessary to have confidence in the result. While the Council
correctly concluded that, under the Act, it could not consider any allegations
of impropriety during Mahan's tenure as a state court judge,383 it failed to
explain why the special treatment he apparently gave certain friends and
colleagues as a federal judge was not as problematic as it appeared. By
keeping all of the evidence under seal and failing to explain its findings,
the judiciary left itself vulnerable, once again, to charges of institutional
bias.
VI. REWRITING THE ACT
The problem of institutional bias, which has hampered the effectiveness
of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, cannot be resolved by the
judicial rule-making for two reasons. First, all four factors-secrecy,
381 Id.
382 See id. at 1-2.
383 The Act applies only to a judge serving on the federal bench, defined as "a circuit
judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 351 (d)(i) (zoo8).
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unequal allocation of rights, preference for home circuit resolution, and
lack of mandatory sanctions-are, to some degree, written into the text or
the legislative history of the Act itself. Second, while the judiciary is in the
position to make some important changes, particularly as to the latter three
factors, it has shown a deep-seated reluctance to do so.
Constraints imposed on the judiciary by Congress have typically met
with concerns about the separation of powers. But, the congressionally
imposed limits suggested in this Article are unlikely to set off a constitutional
crisis. They are simply suggestions for improving legislation that has been
in place-and upheld as constitutional-for nearly thirty years. Indeed,
the proposed reforms are quite mild compared with the very real threat
that Congress will do away with the Act altogether and administer judicial
discipline in the form of an Inspector General.
The legislative changes to the Act outlined below are designed to
address each factor in the four-factor problem:
A. Secrecy
'More than any other factor, the near-total secrecy cloaking federal
judicial disciplinary proceedings perpetuates the appearance and reality
of institutional bias in the Act's enforcement. As written, the Act forbids
disclosure of all evidence relating to misconduct investigations, requiring
that only the final decisions be made public. The terse, unreasoned
orders in the Kent and Mahan cases starkly illustrate the problem with this
approach: when there is no transparency in the process, the judiciary is
virtually unaccountable for its disciplinary decisions. Some might argue
that the Act never intended such a result, and that the judicial councils
in the Kent and Mahan cases violated section 360(b)'s directive that all
disciplinary orders "shall be accompanied by written reasons therefore.""s
While this argument may have merit, it is also true that "written reasons"
is a standard so vague as to potentially encompass the Kent and Mahan
Councils' interpretation of it. More importantly, there is no redress when
Judicial Councils issue inscrutable decisions.
Nor does the Act's strict confidentiality provision serve the purpose
for which it was intended-to "avoid possible premature injury to the
reputation of the judge.138 In every high-profile misconduct complaint
cited in the Breyer Committee Report the judge's identity was revealed by
the media while the process was ongoing.386 If anything, the secrecy with
384 z8 U.S.C. § 36o(b) (2008).
385 S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4330 (1979).
386 Recognizing the possibility of such "leaks," the Act's legislative history provides
that the judiciary may want to respond publicly, with a written statement explaining the
disciplinary process and making clear that an investigation into a misconduct complaint is not
the equivalent of a finding of guilt. See 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4330.
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which the Act is administered only harms the reputation of the accused
judge. Sealing the evidence suggests that there is something worth hiding.
And, because the Act does not prevent the complainant and others from
speaking to the press, the judiciary is unable to dam the flow of information.
As the sole source of information, the media becomes the de facto authority
on the case. The judiciary's loss of control can be particularly problematic
when the media, which has no access to the documentary or testimonial
evidence and cannot speak directly with the accused judge, relies on
inaccurate or unreliable sources, allowing rumor and innuendo to supplant
the facts.
But, while the process must be made more accessible to the public to
have legitimacy, it need not-and should not-be completely transparent.
The vast majority of misconduct complaints are frivolous or not within the
scope of the Act, and chief judges properly dismiss them as such. The
current procedure, which is to make those dismissal orders public without
revealing the name of the judge, is entirely proper. Publicizing unfounded
accusations causes needless embarrassment for the accused judge and
erodes public confidence in the efficacy of the system.3"7
It is only when a complaint alleges misconduct warranting further
investigation that the public's right to know becomes paramount. This
Article proposes, therefore, that Congress amend the confidentiality
provision of the Act to make the disciplinary process public if and when
the chief judge decides to appoint a Special Committee to explore an
allegation of misconduct.3"' Only complaints with a "factual foundation
[not] conclusively refuted by objective evidence" advance this far.38 9
The decision to appoint a Special Committee is roughly analogous to a
probable cause determination, the point at which criminal prosecutions
become public.3 As with a criminal prosecution, making the allegations
public is not designed to provoke a premature determination of guilt,
387 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 234, at 468-69.
388 In Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-Democratic Values and Judicial Integrity at
Stake, Sahl, supra note 234, at 25o-56, Professor John Sahl argues for "opening the entire
process." Id. at 250-5 1. This Article takes a more moderate approach.
389 28 U.S.C. §§ 352(b)(i)(B), 353(a) (2oo8).
390 The Supreme Court has held that the public has a First Amendment right to attend
criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (198o). The Court
has never squarely addressed the question whether this right extends to attendance at judicial
misconduct hearings, although it has spoken approvingly of confidentiality provisions in this
context. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835-36 (1978); see
also First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 784 E2d 467, 472-
77 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of private judicial disciplinary hearings).
For a discussion of the relevant caselaw and an argument in favor of extending the right of
attendance to judicial disciplinary proceedings, see Comment, A First Amendment Right of Access
to Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1984).
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but rather to make the process itself accountable. 391 Open hearings and
access to evidence educate the public about the disciplinary system, instill
confidence that the proceedings are fair, and dispel the harmful perception
that judges are "anointed priests set apart from the community and spared
the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed.
39
1
California's judicial disciplinary system is a good model for this balanced
approach. The rules employed by the Commission on Judicial Performance
(CJP),393 which handles all misconduct complaints against state court judges,
provides for confidentiality in the complaint process at the preliminary
stages. 394 If a complaint is dismissed outright or found meritless after a
preliminary investigation, no public information is released.395 In the event,
however, that the CJP "institutes formal proceedings" against a judge, the
process becomes transparent. Disciplinary hearings, documentary evidence,
factual findings, sanctions, and written orders are open to the public. 396 The
state of California maintains a Web site that explains the Commission's
responsibilities, lists the names of the judges it has disciplined, the types
of discipline imposed, and provides links to its written opinions.397 The
CJP has won praise for its transparency and effectiveness, and its methods
have been adopted by a majority of the states. 39  Congress should follow
suit. The transparency conferred by a more open procedure is crucial to
the Act's legitimacy, and experience has demonstrated that the statute's
confidentiality provision does nothing to mitigate the harm to the accused's
reputation that it was intended to guard against.
391 See Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,606 (1982) (holding
that public access to criminal trials "enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of
the factfinding process" and "fosters an appearances of fairness, thereby heightening public
respect for the judicial process").
392 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Sahl,
supra note 234, at 246-57.
393 The California Commission on Judicial Performance, established by constitutional
amendment in I96O, was the nation's first state judicial disciplinary organization. See CAL.
CONsT. art. IV, § I8(i); Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1233, 1261-62 (2O00). The eleven-member commission is composed of judges, attorneys, and
six lay citizens appointed to four-year terms. See CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §8(a).
394 See STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, RULES OF THE
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, R. 102(a)-(b), (e) (2oo9), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/
commrules.htm. [hereinafter CJP RULES].
395 Id. atR. 102(e).
396 Id.
397 See State of California Commission on Judicial Performance, Home Page, http://web.
archive.org/web/*/http://cjp.ca.gov/pubdisc.htm (Last viewed Oct. 16, zooS).
398 See Long, supra note 32, at 23 ("[In a majority of states, complaints concerning
judicial misconduct become public upon a finding by the [Judicial Disciplinary Committeel
that there is indicia of misconduct warranting a formal hearing."); Sankar, supra note 393, at




B. Leveling the Playing Field
The legislative history of the Act clearly expressed Congress's intent
that the judiciary "give serious consideration to providing the complainant
with [the] same rights that are provided to the judge against whom a
complaint has been filed. '' 399 Nonetheless, throughout the Act's nearly
three-decade-long history, the judiciary has treated the parties unequally,
providing the accused judge with all of the rights guaranteed a criminal
defendant, and giving the complainant only the right to notice of the
proceedings.' As the Kent case demonstrates, leaving the complainant's
level of involvement to the judiciary's discretion means that she may
be shut out of the process entirely. Congress clearly did not intend this
result. And, given that Congress did not extend the Act's confidentiality
provision to the complainant, it is also unlikely that it would approve of the
judiciary's conditioning the complainant's degree of participation on "the
degree of the complainant's cooperation in preserving the confidentiality of
the proceedings."'"
As justification for treating the parties unequally, the Rules state that
the disciplinary process is "fundamentally administrative and inquisitorial,"
rather than adversarial. But this assertion is undermined by the judiciary's
decision to put the accused judge, rights-wise, on the same footing as
a criminal defendant. If the proceeding were truly "administrative and
inquisitorial," there would be no need to provide the subject of those
proceedings with full Sixth Amendment coverage. And in any event, the
negative consequences of treating the complainant unequally are great,
and the benefits minimal, if nonexistent. Giving the judge a voice while
silencing his accuser signals that the decision-makers believe that the
former is worth listening to and the latter is not.
Amending the Act to open the disciplinary proceedings in the manner
suggested above goes some way toward ameliorating the problem: as a
member of the public, the complainant would be able to attend the
disciplinary hearings and inspect the documentary evidence. But lifting
the veil of secrecy is not enough; Congress must rewrite the Act to make
good on its intent that the complainant enjoy the same rights as the accused.
The complainant, like the judge, should have the right to counsel, to
present evidence that she feels the judicial council may have overlooked,
and to argue her case. Only by leveling the playing field can the judiciary
dispel the appearance-and sometime reality-that the process is tilted
in the judge's favor. Nor is there a substantial likelihood that affording
complainants equal rights at the investigatory stage of the proceedings will
399 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4328 (1979).
400 Compare RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R.
8(b),I I(f), 14(a)-(c), & 15 with id. R. 16 (2008).
401 See id. R. 16(e).
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flood the system, as the number of misconduct complaints that reach that
stage are less than one percent of the total number filed annually. 40
The complainant or aggrieved party (if different than the complainant)
should also have a voice in any decision to dismiss a meritorious complaint
because the accused judge has taken "appropriate corrective action." 4 3
The Rules acknowledge that "[i]n some cases, corrective action may not
be appropriate to justify conclusion of a complaint unless the complainant
or other individual harmed is meaningfully apprised of the nature of the
corrective action." 4 4 But the complainant or aggrieved party has no right
to notice of the corrective action and no right to participate in fashioning
it.4°s As the Real and Kent cases demonstrate, ignoring the aggrieved
party at this stage in the process can severely undermine the legitimacy
of the complaint's resolution. The inadequacy of Real's lawyer-authored
apology to redress the harms inflicted on the Canter trust was underscored




And the unenumerated "other measures" deemed "appropriate remedial
action" by the judicial council in the Kent case were publicly denounced as
unacceptable by the complainant, who was never told what this purported
self-correction entailed. 4°7
This Article does not advocate for making every corrective action
disposition contingent upon the complainant's acceptance, but rather for a
process in which judges are required to solicit and weigh the complainant's
opinion about the proposed corrective action before deeming it adequate
to cure the harm. Because the complainant or aggrieved party, like the
accused judge, is not a neutral arbitrator, the Act properly leaves to the
judiciary's discretion the decision to accept or reject the remedial measures
undertaken. But critical to the public's acceptance of voluntary judicial
self-correction is the knowledge that the injured party had a voice in the
process. Unless the Act is amended to allow the complainant or aggrieved
party the opportunity to make its voice heard, the chances are great that
corrective action will be viewed as a satisfactory resolution only in the eyes
of the accused judge, who escapes serious punishment by agreeing to it.
402 See Hellman, supra note 201, at 218.
403 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2) (2008).
404 RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. I I cmt.
405 See id. R. I I & cmt.
406 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F3d 1179, 1196-99 (9th Cir. Jud.
Council 2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
407 See First Kent Order, supra note 292, at z; see also Council & Jeffreys, Houston





As presently written, the Act allows the chief judge and the Judicial
Council, after finding a judge guilty of misconduct, to deal with that judge
in virtually any manner they choose. 8 A meritorious complaint may
be dismissed if the judge takes corrective action, or redressed through
intermediate sanctions such as a private or public rebuke.4" Also possible,
but rarely invoked, are the more serious punishments: suspension from
the bench, a request for early retirement, and referral for an impeachment
inquiry.
410
There are two problems with this grant of unfettered discretion. The
first, as demonstrated by the Real case, is the risk that judges will go too
easy on their offending colleagues. Cabining the judiciary's discretion
with specific, mandated sanctions will greatly reduce this risk. Equally
important is amending the Act's legislative history, which allows for and
even encourages this type of institutional bias by expressing a preference
for "informal, collegial resolution" of valid complaints. 41' This language
frustrates the Act's overriding purpose, which is to ensure that "the growing
public demand for the accountability of public officials extend[s] to the
judicial branch."
41
Unfettered discretion also results in lack of uniformity. By failing to
provide the judiciary with a yardstick by which to measure the seriousness
of any given type of misconduct, the Act allows each circuit to treat the same
misconduct differently. Under the current system, for example, a judge
found guilty of sexual harassment, as in the Kent case, could be privately
reprimanded in one circuit, asked to retire in another, and referred for
criminal prosecution in a third. This plethora of potential options makes
the ultimate sanction-whatever it is-appear arbitrary.
While it isn't possible to tie a specific punishment to every act of
misconduct under the sun, broad parameters can be set. Congress should
clarify the definition of misconduct in the Act by incorporating the list of
examples enumerated in the Rules 413 and prescribe a minimum punishment
for each type of violation. Where misconduct might also constitute criminal
behavior, such as Real's false statements to the council or Kent's alleged
sexual assault, the judiciary should be required to refer the case to the
408 See 28 U.S.C. § 352, 354, 355 (2oo8).
409 See id. 88 352(b)(2); 354(a)(i)(B)-(C); (a)(z)(A)(ii)-(iii).
410 See id. 88 354(a)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(A), 355(b);see also S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (979), as
repintedin i98o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315,4316 (98o).
411 See S. REP. No. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 198o U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4317
(1980).
412 Id. at 4319.




DOJ for possible prosecution and suspend the offender from the bench
during the duration of the ensuing investigation. Serious misconduct that
is not criminal, such as using judicial power "to obtain special treatment for
friends or relatives," 414 engaging in ex parte communications, 4 s or treating
litigants "in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner, '416 should, at
a minimum, result in a public reprimand and an order that the offending
judge complete a course in judicial ethics and undergo psychological
counseling. Less serious violations, such as publicly expressing political
opinions,411 fundraising for organizations, 41s or providing incomplete
financial disclosures, 419 should meet with no lesser sanction than a private
reprimand. Absent extraordinary circumstances, ethical violations, as
defined in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, should result in
a finding of misconduct punishable by a public reprimand.4 0 The burden
should fall to the judge to argue that his or her case is the exceptional one
meriting lesser punishment. Amending the Act to set these clear standards
in the meting out of sanctions will promote uniformity and reduce the risk
that institutional bias will result in watered-down punishments that erode
public confidence in the Act's efficacy.
D. Out-of-Circuit Transfers
The commentary to the newly enacted Rules states that out-of-circuit
transfers "may be appropriate ... where the issues are highly visible and
a local disposition may weaken public confidence in the process. '41 But
the rule itself makes clear that such transfers should be considered only
"[iun exceptional circumstances," 422and in practice, out-of--circuit transfers
are exceedingly rare.413 To reduce the appearance of institutional bias in
the disciplinary process, Congress should amend the Act to make such
transfers presumptive in cases where a complaint has received significant
media attention. While there is always the possibility that institutional
414 See id. R. 3(h)(I)(A).
415 See id. R. 3(h)(1)(C).
416 Id. R. 3(h)(i)(D).
417 See id. R. 3(h)(I)(E).
418 See id. R. 3(h)(i)(F).
419 See id. R. 3(h)(i)(G).
42o Noted scholar Charles Gardner Geyh has long advocated for making the Code of
Judicial Conduct for United States Judges part of the definition of judicial misconduct. See
Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 200 (statement of Professor Geyh).
421 See RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DisABILITY PROCEEDINGS R. 26 cmt
(2oo8).
422 See id. at 4o-41 (R. 26).
423 See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 214 (identifying "eight instances
since 198o" in which a misconduct complaint was transferred out of circuit).
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bias will affect the handling of an obscure complaint, the risk is slight
because most complaints of this type-which comprise the vast majority of
the total number filed-are meritless.41 4 Moreover, given the limited time
and money allocated to the handling of misconduct complaints, a policy of
presumptive out-of-circuit transfers for all complaints is impracticable.4"5
Well-publicized complaints, on the other hand, are exceptional and
exceptionally important: infrequent, but frequently mishandled, unusual,
but disproportionately influential by virtue of their high profile.416 The
judiciary's twenty-nine percent error rate in the handling of these cases
lends credence to the perception that those called upon to do the judging
have a personal or professional connection to the accused that renders them
biased.4"7 Nor is this perception without foundation. Judges within the
same circuit have often known each other for years, sat on the same panels,
attended the same conferences, and moved in the same social circles.
As a result of these sustained personal and professional contacts, respect
and affection may have developed, which would lead reasonable minds
to question whether the home circuit judges were capable of rendering
disinterested judgment. Conversely, if a home circuit judge has taken a
personal or professional disliking to the accused judge, the disciplinary
process may be tainted by the appearance, and perhaps reality, of bias
against the accused. Judges from another circuit, by contrast, are far less
likely to be affected by this type of institutional bias because the odds are
great that they will have only a passing acquaintance with the accused.
Removing a high-profile complaint from the home circuit avoids
another related problem: the disinclination on the part of local judges to
discipline their colleague for fear it will reflect poorly on themselves. An
424 Seeid. at 122.
425 See id. at 2I5 (noting that "transfers may increase time and expense if there is the
need to ship files, arrange witnesses, and handle other matters from a distance").
426 See id. at 123 (stating that "the public is particularly likely to form a view of the
judiciary's handling of all cases upon the basis of these few").
427 See id. at zo6 (stating that "legislative and public confidence in the Act's administration
is jeopardized by less-effective handling of the small number of complaints that are in the
public eye"); Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation of JudicialMisconduct Could Be Mis-Regulation,
89 MICH. L. REv. 609, 615 (199 o ) ("[Tlhe very procedures set up by the judiciary betray a
distinctly unfavorable disposition toward complaints about misbehavior of their fellows.");
Charles G. Geyh, InformalMethods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 244 n.3 (1993)
(documenting widespread belief that "judges cannot be trusted to judge judges"); Long,
supra note 32, at i8-i9 (stating that "the history of judicial councils regarding disciplinary
actions against judges has largely been one of inaction"); Carol T Rieger, The JudicialCouncils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges? 37 EMORY L.J. 45,
94 (1988) (stating that "the judiciary's response to the Act raises serious questions about
judges' willingness to judge other judges"); Pamela A. MacLean, Judging FederalJudges, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 18, 2oo8 (quoting former chairman of American Bar Association's committee on




accused judge in the public eye is not only identified by name, but by circuit
affiliation. That affiliation brings an unwanted degree of notoriety to the
circuit as a whole, much to the embarrassment and chagrin of it members.
In these circumstances, judges may be tempted to dismiss a meritorious
complaint rather than expose their circuit to the additional and unwelcome
media scrutiny that a finding of misconduct and the imposition of severe
sanctions would inevitably attract. Placing the disciplinary responsibility in
the hands of judges geographically removed from this intra-circuit concern
has the added benefit of negating this type of bias.
An excellent example of the use of the inter-circuit transfer process
arose recently. The pending misconduct complaint involves Alex Kozinski,
the current Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, who had argued with such
force and eloquence for a finding of misconduct in the Real case. On June
10, 2008, shortly after impaneling a jury in an obscenity trial (over which he
was presiding by designation as a district court judge),428 Kozinski admitted
to uploading and exchanging pornographic images on his personal website,
alex.kozinski.com. 419 Among the images was a picture of naked women
on all fours painted to look like cows, an individual performing fellatio on
himself, and a man being chased by a sexually aroused donkey.430 While
Kozinski believed that the website was private, it was relatively easy to
access according to the individual who found the images and sent them
to the Los Angeles Times.431 The story attracted national attention, 432 and
hundreds of readers emailed comments, most expressing disgust with
Kozinski and concern over the integrity of judges in general. 433
After recusing himself from the obscenity case and declaring a mistrial,434
Kozinski called upon an out-of-circuit Judicial Council to investigate his
428 See Scott Glover, Trial to Gauge What L.A. Sees as Obscene, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2oo8,
at Ai, available at 2008 WLNR 1o846103 (describing the case as involving movies "which
feature acts of bestiality and defecation").
429 See Scott Glover, Porn Trial in L.A. is Halted; Judge Grants Stay After Conceeding He
Maintained His Own Website with Sexually Explicit Images, L.A. TIMES, June 2, zoo8, at A2,
available at zoo8 WLNR 11046400.
430 See Scott Glover, Judge Maintained Web Site with Explicit Photos, L.A. TIMES, June 12,
2008, at B I.
431 See id.; see also Scott Glover, Probe of Judge Shifted to Court in East: The U.S. 3rd Circuit
Names a Special Panel to Investigate Possible Misconduct of Federal Jurist Alex Kozinski, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 2008, at BI.
432 See All Things Considered: Judge in Obscenity Trial Linked to Porn Web Page (NPR radio
broadcast June 12, 2008); Adam Liptak, Chief Judge Contributed to Racy Website, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, zoo8, at A21; Michael R. Blood, Turned Tables in Porn Case Put Judge in the Spotlight,
LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.) June 15, zoo8, at N4, available at 2oo8 WLNR 1129363 1.
433 See Lara A. Bazelon, Editorial, Kozinski Disciplines Himself: The Misconduct Standards
the Porn-Collecting Judge Advocated Might Now Be Used Against Him, L.A. TIMES, June 17, zoo8,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-bazeloni 7-2oo8junl 7,0,4396754.
story.
434 See Scott Glover, U.S. Judge in Obscenity Trial Steps Down; Alex Kozinski Recuses Himself
2008- 2009 ]
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behavior as potential misconduct under the Act.435 Citing "exceptional
circumstances," the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council reiterated the transfer
request in an order addressed to Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Roberts.4 6  Roberts effected the transfer immediately, reassigning the
complaint to the Third Circuit Judicial Council for all further proceedings.
437
In September 2008, a Special Committee of Third Circuit judges appointed
the head of the litigation division of a prominent law firm to conduct an
investigation, which remains ongoing.
438
Kozinski's request for a transfer, his colleagues' support of that request,
and the Chief Justice's action in granting it were all proper decisions and
deserve commendation. The allegations are well known and salacious,
ensuring that many people will closely scrutinize the outcome. Review
of the complaint by a panel of judges at a physical and emotional distance
from the accused is critical to giving that outcome-whatever it may be-a
veneer of legitimacy. History demonstrates, however, that it is the rare
judge who identifies a complaint against himself and takes affirmative
steps to ensure its unbiased handling. Congress, therefore, should amend
the Act to include a presumptive transfer provision in high-profile cases.
Amid an Uproar Over Sexually Explicit Material that He Posted on His Website, L.A. TIMES, June
14, 2oo8, at B i, available at 2oo8 WLNR 112302o6.
435 Letter of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(June 12, 2oo8), availableatwww.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct.orders.CJA_6-I 2-o8.pdf. While
Kozinski did not specify why his conduct might fall within the Act's purview, the Uniform
Rules define misconduct as including behavior off the bench that results in "a substantial and
widespread lowering of public confidence in the courts among reasonable people." RULES
FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT, supra note 52, at R. 3(h)(2). Kozinski is also potentially vulnerable
to a misconduct finding if the judicial council concludes that he violated the canon of judicial
ethics which provides that a "judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing high standards of conduct, and should personally observe those standards, so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved." MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT Canon I (2008).
436 See Order In Re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 08-90035 (9th Cir. Jud.
Council June 16, 2oo8), available at www.ca9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/o8_9oo35.pdf.
437 See Letter from Chief Justice John Roberts to Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica (June
16, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/Rule-26-Transferletter.pdf.
438 Dechert Attorney Hired to Run Kozinski Probe, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008 at 3. In early
December 2oo8, the former chief of the Administrative Office of the federal courts filed a
misconduct complaint against Kozinski with the Third Circuit accusing him of illegally
disabling the federal judiciary's Internet security software in 2001. Michael Doyle Appellate
Judge in the Hot Seat Over Internet Imagery: Former Court Chief Claims "Felonies and Other
Crimes," MERCED SUN-STAR, Dec. 2, zoo8, at B i. Describing Kozinski's conduct as felonious,
the former AO chief alleged that after Kozinski disabled the security system court officials and
employees visited i oo adult Web sites and downloaded pornography. See id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Institutional bias infects the Act as currently written and enforced. This
Article identifies the four interrelated factors that allow institutional bias
to flourish and recommends that Congress amend the statute to address
them. Until these changes are made, a level of dysfunction in the judicial
disciplinary system will persist, along with the public's perception that
judges entrusted with disciplining their colleagues often look the other
way when they behave in an unethical, abusive, or unlawful manner.
To remedy the problem of institutional bias, Congress must rewrite the
Act to make the proceedings transparent, afford complainants the same
rights as judges, provide for out-of-circuit transfers in high-profile cases
where the home circuit's impartiality might be questioned, and provide for
mandatory sanctions for specific misdeeds. Judges are human beings just
like the rest of us, and putting on a black robe should not immunize them
from legitimate punishment for cognizable misconduct.

